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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN THE
SUBMERGED LANDS CASES
JonathanL Charney*
When the Constitution established three branches of government, it did not create three hermetically sealed areas of responsibility. The executive, legislative and judicial branches are required
to govern through a certain degree of accommodation. One area in
which the need for accommodation between the judicial branch
and the other two branches was recognized at an early stage is
cases containing questions bearing on foreign relations.' Under the
Constitution it appears that the conduct of the foreign relations is
vested in the Executive with a secondary role for the Congress, but
that the courts have no role to play in this area. Litigation brought
to the courts, however, has been found to demand decisions affecting foreign relations. To avoid breaching the constitutionally required separation of powers in these instances, the Supreme Court
has determined that the judiciary should move away from its role
as a neutral decision maker. In these instances the courts are either
to decide the cases consistent with the wishes of the executive
to refuse to decide, thus effectively sanctioning the stabranch or
2
tus quo.
Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. Chief, Marine Resources
Section, Land and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of
Justice, 1972. B.A., 1965, New York University; J.D., 1968, University of Wisconsin. The author wishes to thank David A. Boillot, third-year law student at
Vanderbilt, for his assistance.
1. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); United States v.
Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).
2. Many legal scholars have analyzed the deference doctrine. E.g., R. FALK,
THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 9-11, 34-35, 5859, 86-107, 118-21, 136-37, 142-45, 152-53, 160-61, 168-69, 175-77 (1964);
*

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS

(3d Cornell Conf. on Int'l Law 1960);

Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of
Prerogativefor Abdication to Usurper, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461 (1963); Dickinson,
The Law of Nations as National Law: PoliticalQuestions, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 451
(1956); Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1024, 1046-56 (1967); Jessup, Has the Supreme
Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?,40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946); Lillich, The
ProperRole of Domestic Courts and InternationalLegal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'I L.
9 (1970); Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248; Note,
The Relationship between Executive andJudiciary:The State Department as the
Vol. 7-No. 2
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One series of cases in which the Supreme Court has indicated
its willingness to be bound by executive suggestion is the federalstate submerged lands litigation. That litigation involves a thirtyyear dispute between the federal government and the coastal states
of the Union over the seaward boundary of those states' rights to
the resources of the ocean off their respective shores. 3 Early in the
litigation the Supreme Court equated this dispute with the question of the extent of the United States sovereignty in the ocean, a
question that has foreign relations ramifications.' As a consequence, it has deferred to the Executive on certain substantive
issues. Since the Supreme Court has never made a systematic
study of the basis for bringing judicial restraint into play in this
litigation, there is a great deal of confusion concerning its application.
This confusion was recently illustrated in a federal district court
decision involving one aspect of the submerged lands dispute. In
United States v. Alaska,5 the court decided contrary to an executive suggestion on the extent of United States sovereignty off the
Alaska coast. The State of Alaska urged that Cook Inlet is a historic inland water bay giving the state, rather than the federal
government, the exclusive right to exploit the resources of the
Inlet. The United States argued that the area is not historic inland
waters but high seas in which vessels of foreign nations could travel
unmolested. It argued that the district court was bound by that
executive position because of the Supreme Court's holding in previous submerged lands decisions that the Executive's position is to
be accepted unless it is proved to be "clear beyond doubt" that the
historic evidence is to the contrary. Although it gave lip service to
that requirement, the district court found that the Executive's
position had "low reliability" and proceeded to find contrary to the
Executive's suggestion.
Supreme Court of InternationalLaw, 53 MINN. L. REV. 389 (1968); 14 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 131 (1973); 8 HARV. INT'L L.J. 388 (1967); 53 MINN. L. REV. 389 (1968); 48
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 750 (1973); 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 272 (1972). These
writings primarily analyze the many Supreme Court and lower court decisions in

the field stretching back as far as 1803 through the most recent and confusing
opinion in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972).
3. For the major submerged lands decisions see note 91 infra.
4. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
5. 352 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alas. 1972).
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It is apparent from the district court's treatment of the deference
question that it doubted the appropriateness of judicial restraint
in submerged lands cases and that it did not understand the injunction of the Supreme Court. This error is primarily the product
of the Supreme Court's failure to identify the factors that require
judicial restraint for foreign relations reasons and to test the submerged lands cases against those factors. If the Supreme Court
would conduct this examination, this writer submits that it would
probably find judicial restraint inappropriate in the submerged
lands cases.
Part one of this article undertakes that review by delineating the
primary subject matter areas in which judicial restraint has been
exercised for foreign relations purposes. These areas are: recognition, sovereign immunity, act of state, treaty interpretation and
terriorial questions. Each area involves a different combination of
factors that lead to judicial restraint. By isolating those factors we
are able to create a rough yardstick with which other cases, including the submerged lands cases, might be measured.'
I.

JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND DEFERENCE

United States courts frequently apply general principles of international law. As early as 1815 Chief Justice Marshall stated that
in the absence of an act of Congress "the Court is bound by the
law of nations which is a part of the law of the land." 7 One difficulty that arises from the application of international law in domestic courts is the possible intrusion on the conduct of foreign
affairs, an area traditionally held to be the domain of the Executive.8 The judiciary thus has frequently refused to adjudicate a
6. The factors derived from this examination are enumerated in Pt. I(C) infra.
7. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815). Although several theories
support the incorporation of international law into United States law, the most
frequently advanced argument is that international law was part of English common law and as such became part of the common law of the colonies. See Sprout,
Theories as to the Applicability of InternationalLaw in the Federal Courts of the
United States, 26 Am.J. INT'L L. 280, 282 (1932). One inherent difficulty with this
position, however, is that the individual states cannot alter international law;
therefore, if international law is to be considered part of common law, it must be
presumed to be part of federal common law. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964). For a discussion of the effect of international
law in British courts see J. BRiERLY, THE LAW OF NATiONs 86-93 (6th ed. 1963).
8. The most expansive view of the scope of the Executive's authority in foreign
Vol. 7-No. 2
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question that has a significant impact in the area of foreign affairs
on the grounds that deciding the question would violate the separation of powers doctrine, i.e. that a "political question" is involved. On the other hand, the courts often make an independent
assessment of international law and apply that law even when
doing so appears to intrude on the conduct of foreign affairs. For
example, in The Paquete Habana,9 the Supreme Court considered
whether coastal fishing vessels were exempt from capture as prizes
of war. The Court examined recognized international practice in
this area and found that the custom of civilized nations had ripened into a rule of international law that exempted the fishing
vessels, their cargoes and their crews from capture.
Since the issue revolved around the legality of the capture of a
Spanish fishing vessel by the United States, the recognition of the
fishing boat immunity required the invalidation of the federal action vis-A-vis another country's ship in time of war. The dissent
clearly raised this possible conflict with the allocation to the Executive of both the foreign relations power and the power as Commander in Chief. Despite this plea the Court found itself with
sufficient power to overrule the Executive's action. Discussing the
independent examination of international practice, the Court
stated:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations .... II
The Paquete Habana, therefore, squarely presents the issue:
under what circumstances should the judiciary adjudicate a question that may have an impact on the conduct of foreign affairs and
under what circumstances should the judiciary abstain. Between
these two possibilities of adjudication and abstention is the judicial practice of merely deferring to the Executive's position and
reaching a decision by adopting that position. The purpose of the
affairs is found in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936).
9. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
10. 175 U.S. at 700.
Spring, 1974
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inquiry in this section is to identify the factors that militate in
favor of each of these three possible courses of action."
A.

Political Questions

1. Recognition.-One of the earliest expressions of the approach of the judiciary to the question of recognition' 2 is found in
United States v. Palmer.'3 Chief Justice Marshall observed, in
dictum,' 4 that questions concerning the rights of foreign colonies
that are asserting their independence are political rather than
legal.
They belong more properly to those who can declare what the law
shall be; who can place the nation in such a position with respect
to foreign powers as to their own judgment shall appear wise; to
11. Necessary in this organization is the presumption that the failure of the
courts to adjudicate a dispute independently is the exception rather than the rule.
This preliminary conclusion can only be made on the basis of the volume of cases
and subject areas touching on the international arena in which no mention of the
separation of powers question is found, beginning with the PaqueteHabanacase
and continuing to this day. For a comprehensive collection of domestic cases
touching on the international arena see the multivolume collection, AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES 1783-1968 (F. Deak ed. 1971). In contrast, areas of

international affairs in which the deference question has arisen are discussed
below.
12. Recognition extends not only to states and governments, but may also
apply to a status of hostilities. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrruTION 48 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE
UNITED STATES § 94, comment e (1965). Therefore, judicial deference might also
be applicable in these areas. There is authority to support the view that the status
of neutrality of the United States is a proper area for deference. See 11 AM. J.
INT'L L. 883 (1917).
On the question of the legality of a particular war, the District Court for the
District of Kansas held that it would defer to the political branches concerning
the legality of the Viet Nam war. Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan.
1968).
13. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).
14. The issue in Palmer was whether defendants had committed the offence
of piracy, which under the Act of 1790, ch. 36, § 8, 1 Stat. 113-14, was proclaimed
to be a crime against United States citizens. Defendants had committed a robbery on board a ship that belonged to subjects of a foreign state but which was
on the high seas at the time of the crime. Moreover, the victims were not United
States citizens. The Court concluded that the crime of robbery, committed under
these circumstances, did not constitute piracy as defined in the Act. This conclusion properly disposed of the case; Chief Justice Marshall's observations concerning political recognition are obiter dictum.
Vol. 7-No. 2
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whom are intrusted all its foreign relations; than to that tribunal
whose power as well as duty is confined to the application of the rule
which the legislature may prescribe for it. '5
The policy of complete deference to the Executive on questions
of recognition was given its most expansive interpretation in
United States v. Pink.'" The Supreme Court stated that the Executive has the sole authority to recognize foreign governments, a
power derived from his constitutionally defined function of receiving and appointing ambassadors under article II. This explicit constitutional commitment to the Executive is the primary factor
militating in favor of deference in recognition questions. Thus, if
the courts have to determine whether a country exists for the purposes of domestic litigation they look no further than statements
7
of the Executive.,
Not only does the judiciary defer to the Executive's act of recognizing a foreign government, the courts have also deferred in the
face of nonrecognition. Thus in The Maret,'" the court sought to
determine the ownership of the S.S. Maret, which had been nationalized when Soviet troops occupied Estonia in 1940. Title was
purportedly transferred to the Estonian State Steamship Line,
organized by the People's Commissar of the Maritime Fleet. The
court determined it could not recognize the Estonian State Steamship Line as the owner of the ship since the United States had not
recognized the Soviet Republic of Estonia: "A policy of nonrecognition when demonstrated by the Executive must be deemed to be
as affirmative and positive in effect as a policy of recognition. ' "'
Therefore, it appears that the courts will also defer to the executive's policy of nonrecognition."
15.

16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 633-34.

16. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
17. The Pink decision deals primarily with the validity of executive agreements. In Pink, the Court upheld the agreement in question on the basis of the
Executive's power of recognition. See generally Note, United States ti. Pink-A
Reappraisal,48 COLUM. L. REv. 890 (1948).
18. 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1944).
19. 145 F.2d at 442 (footnotes omitted). The court noted that the Executive
had made its position plain by "freezing" property located in the United States
that belonged to citizens of the Baltic Republics, including the former Republic
of Estonia. 145 F.2d at 442 n.43.
20. Accord, Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. Clark, 188 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir. 1951). But cf. M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y.
220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
Spring, 1974

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

The articulated basis for deference to the Executive on questions
of recognition is the inference reached from the power of the President to appoint and receive ambassadors under article II, section
2. This deference exists with such vigor for two reasons. First, this
power is discretionary, with only political standards to guide it.
There is no consensus in international law that requires recognition,2' and phrases such as the one from which the President's
power to recognize is derived have been construed as discretionary
beginning with Marbury v. Madison.2 2 Secondly, the question of
21. There are at least two schools of thought. One is that there is an international law standard based on criterion for establishing statehood and a government. H. LAUTERPAcHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 62-63 (1947). The
other is that the decision is purely political. See C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND
REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 (rev. ed. P. Corbett transl. 1968). The
United States adheres to the latter. 1 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 174-92 (1940). However, even the former leaves room for dispute since the
international law standard is not clear. See, e.g., Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 3, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097 (1935-36).
22. Although Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), does not
directly concern the question of international relations, the long opinion of Chief
Justice Marshall contains the seeds for one aspect of the judicial deference doctrine. The Court outlined the power of the courts to inquire into actions of the
Executive. It excluded from its power of inquiry those areas in which either the
Congress or the Constitution had granted complete discretion to the Executive.
"[Tihe question, whether the legality of an act of the head of a department be
examinable in a court of justice or not, must always depend on the nature of that
act.
By the Constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain
important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion,
and is accountable only to his country in his political character and to his own
conscience.
[Tihere exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects
are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being intrusted
to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive. .

.

. But when the

legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed
peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is
amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the
vested rights of others." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 164.
From this part of the Marbury opinion we can identify certain factors that must
be considered before the court will examine positions of the Executive. First of
all, one must analyze the nature of the act. Does it involve the rights of individuals or does it involve broader questions of policy? Second, is the power of the
Vol. 7-No. 2
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the recognition of another nation or government goes to the very
heart of the relations of the United States with foreign nations.'
Were the courts to limit the discretion of the President on recognition they could thwart most international actions by the President,
from the conduct of negotiations to the entry into force of treaties.
Accordingly, the Court has given the President total dominance of
this question.
2. Sovereign Immunity. -Deference in sovereign immunity
cases in United States courts is based on the same considerations
on which judicial deference in the area of recognition rests. Reliance on the Executive is not as complete, however, because of the
absence of an explicit constitutional allocation of power to the
Executive. In addition, some international standards exist, requiring that a sovereign be immune from judicial process in a foreign
court. 24 In a leading sovereign immunity case, The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden,2' the Supreme Court considered a libel
against a French warship. Chief Justice Marshall dismissed the
libel on grounds of international comity. Although the Executive
had filed a suggestion of immunity, the Chief Justice refused to
rule on the question of the effect to be given the suggestion. He
found ample grounds for dismissing the libel in the principle of
international equality of nations and the custom2 of exempting visiting warships from the host state's jurisdiction. 1
Beginning with Ex Parte Peru,2 the courts have characterized
sovereign immunity as a political question based on the extensive
powers of the Executive in foreign affairs. It is suggested, however,
that the underlying factor that leads to the conclusion that soverExecutive in the area one of discretion or one of obligation?
23. In the case of M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186
N.E. 679 (1933), the question of the mere existence of an unrecognized government was raised. The court found consistent with a statement from the Secretary
of State that the Soviet Russian Government existed de facto despite United
States policy that it had only recognized the Provisional Government of Russia.
As a result, Sovit Russian Government law was held to bar the instant expropriation claim.

24. See W.

BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW

658 (3d, ed. 1971).

25. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
26. The law of nations also supported a grant of immunity in Berizzi Bros.
Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926). In that case, the Court granted immunity
in the face of a State Department suggestion that immunity need not be granted.
27. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
Spring, 1974
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eign immunity is a political question is still the proximity of the
sovereign power of a foreign state. The courts will abstain from
taking the property of a sovereign state because to do so could
interfere with the conduct of the affairs of the foreign nation. The
delicate foreign relations question disappears when there is no
question of the sovereign power or property of another state. When
the foreign nation is present, the cases demonstrate that complete
deference is given to the position of the Executive on the question
whether to subject that government to court process. When the
Executive has not expressed an opinion on the grant of immunity,
the courts will nevertheless look to prior State Department pronouncements to determine whether or not the foreign nation is
deemed to be present. This policy is obviously based on the court's
assumption that under the constitutional scheme the Executive
rather than the courts should deal with the conduct of foreign
governments. This position is reinforced by the requirement of
sovereign immunity under international law. Since the extent of
this requirement is indefinite, its implementation is discretionary
and thus up to the arm of the country charged with conducting
relations with foreign countries. The Court has stated that the
judiciary may not exercise its jurisdiction so as to embarrass the
Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs. Therefore, the "courts
are required to accept and follow the executive's determination
"28

Judicial deference to the Executive on sovereign immunity was
extended in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,9 in which the State
Department had taken no position on the immunity question. Noting that in the absence of a request for immunity from the political
branch of the government the judiciary is free to make the determination, the Court, nevertheless, ruled that in order not to act in a
manner that could embarrass the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs, the courts should decide in accordance with the pro28. 318 U.S. at 588. "The certification and the request that the vessel be
declared immune must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive determination
by the political arm of the government that the continued retention of the vessel
interferes with the proper conduct of our foreign relations. Upon the submission
of this certification to the district court, it became the court's duty, in conformity
to established principles, to release the vessel and to proceed no farther in the
cause." 318 U.S. at 589.
29. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
Vol. 7-No. 2
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nouncements of the State Department in prior cases."
In 1952, the State Department released the "Tate letter,"',
which announced that the Department would follow the more current restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.2 Under the rule of
Republic of Mexico, the courts are also bound to follow the restrictive theQry, since it constitutes a pronouncement by the Department. 3 The only truly independent action exercised by the courts
in the area of sovereign immunity takes place in conjunction with
an attempt to determine what the position of the State Department would be in light of the Tate letter when its position is not
articulated. 4
The policy of complete deference is so strong that a State Department declaration urging immunity will prevail over a prior
waiver of immunity by the foreign sovereign. 5 Moreover, even
though the State Department professes to adhere to the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, the Department is not bound by
that theory. If the State Department suggests immunity in a particular case, showing complete disregard for previous policy state30. "It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the
government has not seen fit to recognize." 324 U.S. at 35 (footnote omitted).
31. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of
State, to the Acting Attorney General, Philip B. Perlman, published as Changed
Policy Concerning the Grantingof Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments,
26 DEP't STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
32. Essentially, the restrictive theory prescribes that acts of a public nature
(jure imperii) are granted immunity, while acts of a private or commercial nature
(jure gestionis) are treated as those of a foreign commercial enterprise, The Supreme Court accepted the principles enunciated in the Tate letter in National
City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1954).
33. It is essential to recall, however, that Republic of Mexico applies only
when the Department has not communicated its position in a particular case to
the courts.
34. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit met this issue squarely in
Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). The court postulated the following categories for which immunity would be granted in the absence of an expression of opinion from the executive: (1) internal administrative
acts, such as the expulsion of an alien; (2) legislative acts, such as nationalization;
(3) acts concerning the armed forces; (4) acts concerning diplomatic activity;
and (5) public loans. 336 F.2d at 360.
35. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295 F.2d
24 (4th Cir. 1961).
Spring, 1974
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ments and judicial implementations, the courts feel constrained to
give that suggestion conclusive effect. 6 The controlling factor in
sovereign immunity cases, therefore, is the presence before the
court of a foreign sovereign's property or of a question involving the
sovereign power of a foreign state. Since the Supreme Court has
held in various cases that the conduct of United States affairs visA-vis foreign nations is committed to the Executive, deciding such
a question could infringe on the Executive's powers in violation of
the separation of powers doctrine.
3. Act of State.-The act of state doctrine as originally enunciated by the Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez,3 dictates
that "[elvery sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory." 3 Thus, this doctrine is founded on
considerations similar to sovereign immunity. Although the doctrine is generally believed to be based on domestic law, 39 there is
some authority for concluding that the act of state doctrine is a
rule of conflict of laws4 or a rule of general international law.'
Regardless of its basis, the practical effect of the application of the
act of state doctrine is that the judiciary will refuse to test the
validity of the act of the foreign state. In essence, the act of state
doctrine requires the court to decide the case before it based on the
conclusive presumption that the act of the foreign sovereign is
valid, regardless of any apparent invalidity. The application of
that doctrine is an abdication of the courts' role of adjudication of
the same magnitude as that practiced in deferring to the Executive
36. Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971). See also Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d
24 (4th Cir. 1961), aff'g 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.). For a discussion of the most
recent statutory proposal on sovereign immunity see Note, The Statutory Proposal to Regulate the JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign States, 6 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 549 (1973).
37. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
38. 168 U.S. at 252.
39. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-23 (1964).
40. Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 178-82 (1967).
41. In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., the Court stated: "The principle that
the conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned in
the courts of another ... rests at last upon the highest considerations of international comity and expediency." 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1917).
Vol. 7-No. 2
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on matters regarding recognition or sovereign immunity.
The primary issues raised by the act of state doctrine in United
States courts are first, which of the three branches of the Government determines when to invoke the doctrine, and secondly, if it
is the judiciary's determination, what considerations are relevant.
The discussion of the relevant cases below indicates a tentative
conclusion that the decision is up to the courts with some weight
given to the views of the other branches.
The reasons for this greater independence of the judiciary is
apparent from a number of factors:
(1) The absence of a textual allocation by the Constitution
of the decision to the other branches;
(2) The possible recognition of the act of state doctrine
under international law; and
(3) The minii/hal likelihood that a decision on these matters
would control the actions of either the Executive or the foreign
nations whose actions are involved.
The first attempt by the Executive to intervene in the application of the act of state doctrine occurred in the Bernstein litigation.
Bernstein had owned stock in a German corporation, but had been
coerced to transfer the stock to a Nazi agent. During the war various ships belonging to the corporation had been sunk and Bernstein subsequently brought suit to recover the insurance proceeds.
In Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme,42 Judge
Learned Hand applied the act of state doctrine and refused to
question the validity of the Nazi confiscation. In a subsequent
related case,43 however, the court determined that it was no longer
constrained by the doctrine since the State Department had filed
letters condemning the Nazi confiscation and relieving United
States courts from any restraint on the exercise of jurisdiction. The
court's holding that it was free to disregard the act of state doctrine
as a result of this expression of executive policy gave rise to the
"Bernstein exception." Bernstein, however, did not actually require the application of the act of state doctrine. At the time of the
litigation, Nazi Germany, the government whose acts were being
questioned, no longer existed. Thus, the entire rationale for the act
42. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947).
43. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche Amerikaanscbe-StoomvaaartMaatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam).
Spring, 1974
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of state doctrine-the proximity of the sovereign power of a foreign
state-was not present. Subsequent act of state cases have emphasized that this sensitivity of national nerves is a central consideration in the act of state doctrine."
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino" involved the validity of
Cuban decrees nationalizing sugar plantations in Cuba. The lower
courts had held that although the act of state doctrine would normally apply, the judiciary could adjudicate the case since Cuba
had violated international law. The Supreme Court held that the
act of state doctrine applied and that the courts, therefore, were
precluded from examining the validity of the acts of the Cuban
Government. The Court noted that the act of state doctrine is
compelled neither by international law nor by the Constitution,"
but that the doctrine does have "constitutional underpinnings"
arising from the separation of powers. In discussing the reasons for
invoking the doctrine in that case, the Court pointed out those
underpinnings and that the international law relied on to invalidate the Cuban actions was unclear.47 The law being unclear, the
Court determined that the resolution of the conflict was more appropriately one for the Executive to resolve in its conduct of relations with Cuba:
If the act of state doctrine is a principle of decision binding on
federal and state courts alike but compelled by neither international
law nor the Constitution, its continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the
judicial and political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs. It should be apparent that the greater the
degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of
international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to
render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the
application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather
44. "The balance of relevant considerations may also be shifted if the government which perpetrated the challenged act of state is no longer in existence, as
in the Bernstein case, for the political interest of this country may, as a result,
be measurably altered." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428
(1964).
45. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
46. The Court noted that the text of the Constitution does not require the act
of state doctrine. The judiciary is not irrevocably barred by the Constitution from
reviewing the validity of foreign acts of state.
47. 376 U.S. at 427-28.
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than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent
with the national interest or with international justice. It is also
evident that some aspects of international law touch much more
sharply on national nerves than do others; the less important the
implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the
justification for exclusivity in the political branches."
Moreover, the Court found that it would not be able to make an
objective determination. Any holding other than that the taking
was in violation of international law would embarrass the Executive, since such a holding would be contrary to the Executive's
position. Thus, the Court could not operate as an independent
judiciary without possibly affecting executive actions in foreign
affairs. The Court did not rule on the validity of the Bernstein
exception since an amicus curiae brief filed by the State Department urged the application of the act of state doctrine and, therefore, removed all doubt concerning executive policy. 9
In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,'"the
district court ruled that Sabbatino had been overturned by the
Sabbatino Amendment, 5' which eliminated the judiciary's discre48. 376 U.S. at 427-28.
49. The Court of Appeals had relied in part on two letters from the State
Department filed by the attorneys for defendant. The Supreme Court ruled that
these letters were merely intended to reflect the Department's desire not to make
any statement concerning the pending litigation. 376 U.S. at 420. Thus, the
question of the validity of the Bernstein exception was not before the Court.
50. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
51. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970): "Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act
of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the
principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to
property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming
through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking
after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the principles of
international law, including the principles of compensation and the other standard set out in the subsection: Provided, That this subparagraph shall not be
applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to
international law or with respect to a claim of title or other right to property
acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days
duration issued in good faith prior to the time of the confiscation of other taking,
or (2) in any case with respect to which the President determines that application
of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy
interests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf
in that case with the court."
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tion in applying the act of state doctrine. That statute requires the
courts to adjudicate claims arising out of a taking in violation of
international law unless the Executive asks the court to apply the
act of state doctrine. In Banco, plaintiff had brought suit to recover
the excess realized on the sale of collateral that secured a loan.
First National City Bank counterclaimed that this excess could be
retained as partial compensation for properties expropriated by
Cuba. After extensive litigation the Court of Appeals ruled that the
Sabbatino Amendment did not apply, and held that since the
Bernstein exception should be limited to its own facts, the act of
52
state doctrine applied.
In the Supreme Court the case was a divisive one. Although the
decision was to reverse,53 requiring the lower courts to inquire into
the legality of the expropriations and not to apply the act of state
doctrine, there was no consensus among the five Justices who voted
for reversal. There were three opinions for reversal and one for
affirmance."
Although the immediate question concerned the application of
the act of state doctrine, the more basic issue was the extent to
which the Executive's foreign relations power can diminish the
The impact of the Amendment has been avoided by some courts by holding
that the loss sustained was not a "taking." French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704 (1968). In Menendez v. Faber Coe & Gregg, Inc.,
345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court held that the Sabbatino Amendment
did not apply since the property in question that had been confiscated by the
Cuban Government had belonged to Cuban nationals and, therefore, international law had not been violated.
52. For a discussion of the history of the litigation see 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 272 (1972).
53. It should be noted that there is not an opinion of the Court.
54. For reversal Mr. Justice Rehnquist was joined by the Chief Justice and
Mr. Justice White. They found that the Bernstein exception applied. Accordingly, since the Executive did not want the act of state doctrine applied, the Court
should not do so. 406 U.S. at 760-70. Mr. Justice Douglas voted for reversal on
the ground that plaintiff was the Government of Cuba and, therefore, had made
a limited waiver of the doctrine. 406 U.S. at 770-72. Mr. Justice Powell voted for
reversal on the ground that the balance of factors articulated in Sabbatino for
invocation of the act of state doctrine required that the doctrine not be applied
either in the instant case or in Sabbatino. 406 U.S. at 773-76. For affirmance Mr.
Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Sewart, Marshall and Blackmun. They
argued that the balance of factors articulated in Sabbatino for invocation of the
act of state doctrine required its application in the instant case. 406 U.S. at 77696.
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independent adjudicatory power of the courts. The dicta of six of
the Justices, including four dissenters, indicated that the Executive's power to limit the judicial function is quite narrow.
The three Justices in favor of a broad executive prerogative were
Justices Rehnquist and White and Chief Justice Burger. They appeared to extend absolute judicial deference to the Executive in
any case in which a court decision "might frustrate the conduct of
foreign relations by the political branches of the government.""
Their solution is complete deference to an executive communication that "expressly represents to the Court that application of the
act of state doctrine would not advance the interests of American
foreign policy .... "I' It, would appear that the same reasoning
would apply to any question touching foreign relations.
The six remaining Justices indicated a greater degree of independence from executive requests for judicial action. Mr. Justice
Brennan stated in his dissenting opinion: "As six members of this
Court recognize today, the reasoning of [the Sabbatino] case is
clear that the representations of the Department of State are entitled to weight for the light they shed on the permutation and
combination of factors underlying the act of state doctrine. But
they cannot be determinative."5 7
All six of these Justices adopt the considerations discussed in the
Sabbatino case and elaborate further on them. Mr. Justice Powell
in his separate concurring opinion stressed the necessity that the
foreign relations ingredient be very direct and concurrent: "Unless
it appears that an exercise of jurisdiction would interfere with
delicate foreign relations conducted by the political branches, I
conclude that the federal courts have an obligation to hear cases
such as this." 8
The other five Justices rely on Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent.
Justice Brennan, taking issue with Justice Rehnquist, stated that
the basis of the act of state doctrine is found in the political question doctrine. The possible impairment of the Executive's conduct
of foreign affairs was found to be only one, and not necessarily the
most important, factor in deciding whether a political question is
55. 406 U.s. at 767-68.
56. 406 U.S. at 768.
57. 406 U.S. at 790.
58. 406 U.S. at 775-76.
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involved."0 Furthermore, the dissent concluded that adoption of
the Bernstein exception would politicize the judiciary. The dissent
submitted that by asking the judiciary to adjudicate a question of
international law when there is no consensus in the international
community concerning the controlling legal principles, the Executive transformed the judiciary from its natural role as a neutral
interpreter into the role of an advocate in the international community-thus supplanting the Executive. The result of this transformation, the dissent concluded, is to cause the judiciary to become a political arm, thereby bringing the rule of law into disrespect both domestically and internationally.
It appears that in light of the views of the six Justices who
stressed the judicial prerogative to determine the extent of a
court's power to adjudicate an issue before it, the constitutionality
of the Sabbatino Amendment is in question. If it is viewed as an
attempt by the Congress to allocate to the Executive the role of
determining when an expropriation is or is not a political question,
it can be viewed as an unconstitutional invasion of the court's role
as arbiter of the separation of powers. 0 Similarly, it could be
viewed as an unconstitutional bill of attainder permitting the
State Department to invoke the act of state doctrine on specific
arbitrarily chosen occasions. On the other hand, if it is viewed as
a statement of substantive law eliminating the act of state doctrine
except when foreign affairs interests predominate, it may be upheld.
If any conclusion can be reached concerning judicial deference
as affected by the act of state cases, it is that its scope will be
determined on a case-by-case analysis based on a number of factors. Some of the factors articulated in the context of the act of
state doctrine and probably applicable to other areas are: (1) the
risk that an independent court decision will upset specific current
59. "To the contrary, the absence of consensus on the applicable international
rules, the unavailability of standards from a treaty or other agreement, the existence and recognition of the Cuban Government, the sensitivity of the issues to
national concerns, and the power of the Executive alone to effect a fair remedy
for all United States citizens who have been harmed all point toward the existence
of a 'political question.'" 406 U.S. at 788 (Brennan, J., concurring).
60. The determination of the existence of a political question has been held
to be the exclusive function of the judiciary. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11
(1962).
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activities of the Executive vis-A-vis one or more foreign countries;
and (2) the clarity of the international law to be administered."'
B.

JudicialDiscretion

Although they touch on foreign affairs, questions of treaty interpretation and national territorial limits are treated differently in
domestic courts than issues of recognition, sovereign immunity
and act of state. Treaties present unique problems for the courts:
treaties are, at the same time, part of the supreme law of the land
under the Constitution, and compacts among sovereign entities.
Under the former characterization, treaties are subject to the traditional interpretation by the courts. Under the latter characterization, however, they become imbued with the political considerations relating to the Executive's actual conduct of foreign affairs,
i.e. the considerations present in a political question.
It also should be noted that balancing the competing interests
of private parties is also a traditional function of the courts. International territorial disputes often present the courts with the same
dilemma as treaty interpretation, i.e. how to fulfill its traditional
function of deciding private rights and interpreting the law while
adhering to the separation of powers doctrine. Resolving this dilemma is also a function of the courts, for, as the Supreme Court
ruled in Baker v. Carr," determining the existence of a political
question is the exclusive function of the judiciary.
Questions of treaty interpretation and international territorial
disputes thus present considerations similar to those discussed
above, but the traditional functions of the courts dictate that judicial abstention is not a possibility. The only available alternatives
are deference to the Executive's position or an independent judgment by the courts. Identifying the factors that militate in favor
of adopting one of these alternatives is helpful in determining
which alternative the judiciary should select in the submerged
lands cases.
1. Treaty Interpretation.-When faced with a problem concerning the construction of a treaty, the courts often give "great
weight" to the Executive's interpretation. In general, the Executive's interpretation has been viewed as an aid in the court's interpretation of the treaty language and not as a determinative fact
61. 376 U.S. at 428.
62. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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which must be followed. The position submitted by the Executive
may be supplemented by the traditional information used to interpret statutory language depending on the existence of various factors that either militate in favor of judicial independence or militate in favor of judicial deference. A significant factor that can be
identified as favoring independent action by the judiciary is the
presence of a question involving individual liberties. On the other
hand, the judiciary will be disposed to defer to the Executive if the
question presented is the subject of international negotiation or
controversy in which the political branches of the government have
expressed an opinion to other nations.
In The Amiable Isabella,13 the Court considered the construction
of a treaty that may have circumscribed the appropriateness of a
passport form. The Court viewed its function as that of determining the "intention of the parties, by just rules of interpretation,
applied to the subject-matter; and having found that, our duty is
to follow it, as far as it goes, and to stop where that stops-whatever may be the imperfections or difficulties which it leaves behind."" Thus, as in the interpretation of a contract, when the
meaning of a treaty is uncertain, the courts look to the negotiations
and diplomatic correspondence of the contracting parties and to
the practical construction given the subject matter by the parties
in an effort to ascertain the apparent intentions of the parties." '
Since the position taken by the Executive is evidence of the meaning intended by one of the parties, the courts give these positions
great weight." In this context, however, the consideration given
executive actions is not deference as used previously, but merely
an indication of the intent of one of the parties. The assignment
of "great weight" to the executive positions, however, does constitute deference.
Similarly, in Sullivan v. Kidd, 7 the issue was whether the
Treaty of March 2, 1899,8 between the United States and Great
63.
64.
65.
66.

19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1 (1821).
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 71.
Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929).
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933). See also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

152 (1965).

67. 254 U.S. 433 (1921).
68. Convention with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Relating to the Tenure and Disposition of Real and Personal Property, Mar. 2, 1899,
31 Stat. 1939, T.S. No. 146.
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Britain permitted an inheritance of land located in Kansas by a
Canadian citizen despite a Kansas statute prohibiting alien inheritance. At the time of the suit, the United States and Great Britain
held differing views on the interpretation of the treaty. In its diplomatic correspondence, the United States maintained that citizens
of Canada were not within the scope of the treaty and submitted
a brief in support of this position to the Court. The Court, maintaining its independence, stated the general rule that treaties are
to be interpreted according to the principles governing the interpretation of contracts. To effectuate the purposes of the parties the
Court examined the negotiative history. However, the Court went
further than the previous cases and seemed to hold that the Executive's position as expressed in an amicus brief should be given great
weight and that the Treaty did not supersede Kansas law.
In Sullivan, the Court was readily able to ascertain the Executive's position since the Government had filed a brief. In other
cases, such as Factor v. Laubenheimer,0 recourse to diplomatic
correspondence is required. The presence of the United States as
a party, of course, disposes of the problem of ascertaining the
Executive's position. A clear expression of that position, however,
does not insure that the judiciary will defer to it. The predominant
factor militating against deference is the limitation of private individual rights by the Executive's position. 70 For example, in Perkins
v. Elg,'7 the Secretary of State relied on a naturalization convention with Sweden to support his finding that respondent was an
alien and should be denied a passport on that ground. The Court
made an independent examination of prior practice under the convention and concluded that the Secretary's finding contradicted
72
the previous rulings.
69. 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
70. See Note, The Relationship Between Executive and Judiciary:The State
Department as the Supreme Court of InternationalLaw, 53 MINN. L. REv. 389,
409 (1968).
71. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
72. Another dimension to this question is the role of the Supreme Court as
the arbiter between the federal and state governments. In Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429 (1968), the Court struck down an Oregon statute that conditioned the
ability of aliens to inherit Oregon property on the presence of a reciprocal right
for United States citizens and the ability of the heirs to take the property without
confiscation. Defendants, citizens of East Germany, claimed the provisions of a
1923 treaty with Germany entitled them to inherit the property. Although the
State Department had communicated to the Court that the statute was not an
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The treaty cases, therefore, identify a number of new perspectives and factors that must be considered to determine the limits
of deference:
(1) deference will be less when the role the judiciary plays
is the traditional role of interpreting the written law along
with preparatory materials;
(2) deference will be greater when the interpretation of the
treaty might change a contractual relationship between the
United States and another nation;
(3) deference will be less when individual rights are at stake;
(4) deference does not have to be complete; rather the court
can give the Executive's position a certain amount of weight;
and
(5) extrajudicial statements of the Executive in conducting
the foreign relations are more persuasive.
2. Territorial Questions.-The cases most directly on point in
a consideration of the submerged lands controversy are those dealing with disputes over the extent of national territory. United
States courts have been faced not only with cases that have involved questions concerning the extent of United States territory
but with at least one case concerning the territory of another nation. As will be shown below, the courts have sought to apply the
deference doctrine in these cases. Since the submerged lands dispute is primarily territorial and since it has a relationship to the
extent of the United States territory in the ocean, the factors that
have been taken into account in the territorial cases are most relevant to an analysis of the role of deference in the submerged lands
cases.
Of all the areas of deference discussed, this area is the least
refined. In fact, the most recent cases indicate a reluctance by the
Supreme Court to come to grips with the question in this context.
impediment to the conduct of foreign relations and that it was not prohibited by
the Treaty, the Court held that the statute "has more than 'some incidental or
indirect effect in foreign countries,' and its great potential for disruption or embarrassment makes us hesitate to place it in the category of a diplomatic bagatelle." 389 U.S. at 434-35. The Court's holding is not directed at the interpretation
of the Treaty; primarily the Court held that the state had intruded on a domain
reserved to the federal government. Therefore, while Zschernig is not actually a
treaty interpretation case, it demonstrates an added factor to be considered when
characterizing a problem as one requiring abstention or not.
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It appears, however, that the courts will give some degree of deference to executive positions in territorial matters. In connection
with questions of the territorial extent of a foreign nation the chief
reason for this deference is probably the reluctance of the courts
to adjudicate the sovereign claims of another nation. An adjudication of such a matter would be most comparable to the sovereign
immunity and act of state questions, in which the decisions would
question the integrity of the foreign government itself. Such activity directly concerns the political relationship of this country with
the foreign country and, thus, is a matter of foreign relations allocated to the Executive.
In cases involving United States territory, the primary rationale
for deference appears to be that an expansion or contraction of
United States territory would cause the converse to occur to the
territorial boundaries of contiguous nations. As to the oceans, their
international character represents the rights of all nations and the
extent of those rights are affected by changes in United States
territorial claims in the sea in the same way that our contiguous
neighbors are affected by territorial changes. Accordingly, the extent of United States territory involves the relations of the United
States vis-d-vis foreign nations and is a foreign relations question.
A review of the cases in the field demonstrates the effect of this
reasoning and the considerations that militate against its strict
application.
The question of the extent of the territorial sovereignty of a
foreign nation first arose in a domestic lawsuit in Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co.73 Plaintiff conducted fishing in an area off the Falkland Islands, which the Buenos Aires Government claimed as its
territory and in which United States fishing was prohibited. Plaintiff refused to recognize this claim and his ships were seized. In this
suit against the insurance company, the insurance company
sought to avoid payment on the grounds that plaintiff had violated
Buenos Aires law and, thus, violated the insurance agreement. The
question of sovereignty over the Falklands was the subject of an
international dispute in which the United States claimed that the
Buenos Aires Government had no sovereignty and therefore no
jurisdiction to control the fisheries near the Falkland Islands. In
determining whether plaintiff had violated a valid law of a foreign
73.

38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839).
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country, the Supreme Court decided to defer conclusively to the
position of the United States on the question whether Buenos Aires
had sovereignty over those islands. The Court stated:
And can there be any doubt, that when the executive branch of the
government, which is charged with our foreign relations, shall, in its
correspondence with a foreign nation, assume a fact in regard to the
sovereignty of any island or country, it is conclusive on the judiciary
department? And in this view, it is not material to inquire, nor is it
the province of the court to determine, whether the executive be
right or wrong. It is enough to know that in the exercise of his
constitutional function he has decided the question. Having done
this, under the responsibilities which belong to him, it is obligatory
on the people and government of the union. If this were not the rule,
cases might often arise, in which, on the most important questions
of foreign jurisdiction, there would be an irreconcilable difference
between the executive and judicial departments. By one of these
departments, a foreign island or country might be considered as at
peace with the United States; whilst the other would consider it in
a state of war. No well-regulated government has ever sanctioned a
principle so unwise, and so destructive of national character . ...
And we think, in the present case, as the executive in his message,
and in his correspondence with the government of Buenos Aires, has
denied the jurisdiction which it has assumed to exercise over the
taken as acted on by this court
Falkland Islands; the fact must be
74
as thus asserted and maintained.

The Court then found the actions of the insured not illegal and
awarded the insurance proceeds to plaintiff.
This decision is probably the high water point for deference to
the Executive on a territorial question. A review of the situation
indicates that there were a number of factors militating in favor
of deference in addition to the factors discussed above. These are:
(1) there were current negotiations between the United
States and a foreign government;
(2) deference was based on extrajudicial communications
from the United States Executive to a foreign government;
(3) the United States was not a party;
(4) the question involved the territory of a foreign nation;
(5) there were no readily identifiable standards available to

74.

38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 420.
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the court to judge the validity of the claim of sovereignty by
the foreign nation; and
(6) even if standards were available, the proof of the facts
would be difficult because of the location of the area in dispute.
Some factors present would militate in favor of judicial independence but they were apparently not of sufficient importance to
change the result:
(1) individual property rights were being litigated;
(2) no foreign nation stood to be affected by any possible
order of the Court either by way of loss of property rights or
by way of injunction directed at any of its actions.
Turning to litigation involving the extent of United States territory, one must begin with the dispute surrounding the cession of
West Florida75 to the United States. This dispute involved a mixed
question of United States territory, territory of a foreign country
and treaty interpretation. The cases involving the West Florida
cession began with the 1829 Supreme Court decision in Foster v.
Neilson.71 The parties claimed title to land located in West Florida
derived from different chains of title. Plaintiff's chain evolved from
a Spanish grant dated 1804 and 1805. Defendant denied the validity of plaintiff's chain arguing that the United States rather than
Spain was the sovereign of the area in 1804 and 1805. Thus, the
question was the date of cession of West Florida to the United
States.
In diplomatic correspondence over many years prior to 1819, the
United States and France contended that Spain, in an ambiguous
treaty of 1800, transferred this area to France and that a quit claim
from France to the United States in 1803 granted the United States
territorial rights in the area. Spain maintained that West Florida
was not granted to France in 1800 and that the first time it relinquished its rights in West Florida was in the treaty of 1819 in which
Spain explicitly ceded West Florida to the United States. Whether
plaintiff's claim based on title from Spain dated 1804 and 1805 was
valid depended on whether the Spanish or the United States con75. West Florida is the land located east of the Mississippi River and west of
the Perdido River.
76. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
Spring, 1974

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

struction of the treaty was adopted. Thus, in Foster,considerations
concerning treaty interpretation and the territorial limits of the
United States and Spain converged. The Court appeared to defer
to the United States position without making an independent examination of the treaties. The Court stated:
If those departments which are intrusted with the foreign intercourse of the nation, which assert and maintain its interests against
foreign powers, have unequivocally ascertained its rights of dominion over a country of which it is in possession, and which it claims
under a treaty; if the legislature has acted on the construction thus
asserted, it is not in its own courts that this construction is to be
denied. A question like this, respecting the boundaries of nations,
is, as has been truly said, more a political than a legal question, and
its discussion, the courts of every country must respect the pronounced will of the legislature. . . . Such a decision would, we
think, have subverted those principles which govern the relations
between the legislative and judicial departments, and mark the lim77
its of each.
As in the previous case it is important to itemize the factors militating in favor of deference:
(1) the Executive's position had been taken extrajudicially
in diplomatic correspondence with foreign governments;
(2) territory previously controlled by a foreign nation was
involved;
(3) international negotiations on the specific question had
taken place and had resulted in a compromise solution;
(4) the Congress had passed laws applicable to the area in
question based on the assumption that it was United States
territory prior to 1804;18 and
(5) the United States was not a party to the action.
Factors militating against deference were:
77. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 309. Subsequent cases on the question of West Florida,
although overruling other aspects of the Foster case, continued to reaffirm the

deference aspects of the case. Davis v. Police Jury of Concordia, 50 U.S. (9 How.)
280 (1850); Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511 (1838); United States v. Perchman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).

78. Congress enacted various statutes, the first in 1812, incorporating portions
of the disputed territory into the State of Louisiana and the territories of Mississippi and Alabama. In addition, Alabama was granted statehood in 1819. 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) at 308.
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(1) the international issue had been conclusively resolved
prior to the litigation;
(2) judicial standards for the interpretation of written documents, as well as the facts, were easily available;
(3) individual property rights were in dispute;
(4) since the area was now clearly within the United States,
the decision either way would not affect the extent of United
States territory vis-&-vis foreign nations; and
(5) no foreign nation was a party to the litigation and none
would be affected by its outcome in terms of either their property or freedom of action.
Although these factors against deference did not carry the day,
they did result in the Court's making some separate inquiry into
the issue at hand. That inquiry might indicate a desire not to give
the executive position conclusive force but merely great weight, in
contrast to the broad language quoted above.
Jones v. United States" has been heralded as the landmark decision in the field of deference of the courts to executive decisions
concerning territorial jurisdiction. The Court stated:
Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a
judicial, but a political question, the determination of which by the
legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and
subjects of that government. This principle has always been upheld
by this court, and has been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances. 0
The Court proceeded to defer to the Executive's position, as expressed in letters, statements and pronouncements, that the
United States did claim jurisdiction over the island of Nevassa and
to hold that the district court, therefore, had properly exercised
jurisdiction in petitioner's murder conviction.
The Court's language in Jones has been cited for the proposition
that it is not in the province of the judiciary to question an executive assertion of territorial jurisdiction by the United States if that
assertion is made, through the exercise of his constitutional functions.8 ' The Court did rely heavily on executive correspondence
79. 137 U.S. 202 (1890).
80. 137 U.S. at 212.
81. E.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 34 (1947); Pearcy v. Stranahon, 205 U.S. 257, 265 (1907).
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with the Government of Haiti and decided the issue in accordance
with the Executive's expressed position. An added factor that is
often overlooked, however, is that the President was acting pursuant to his authority under the Guano Islands Act of 1856.2 That
statute specifically gave the President authority to claim jurisdiction over any islands that he found to be uninhabited, unclaimed
and to contain guano deposits. Thus, the authority of the Executive and the legislature converged. The Court was merely required
to determine that the requirements of the Guano Islands Act were
satisfied and that the Executive asserted jurisdiction over the island in the manner provided in the statute. Although the Court
utilized language that indicates that unilateral action of the Executive in asserting jurisdiction over territory is binding on the
courts, as a result of the legislative delegation the Court was not
faced with a situation in which it was asked to defer to a unilateral
claim of the Executive. 3 Therefore, Jones does not stand for the
proposition that when the judiciary is dealing with the limits of the
territory and sovereignty of the United States it is bound absolutely to defer to statements of the Executive.
The Supreme Court came closer to holding that the Executive's
position is controlling in In re Cooper." That case involved a statute which permitted the United States to exercise its jurisdiction
over fisheries in the territory of Alaska and in the Bering Sea. As
in the Submerged Lands Act,85 Congress intentionally failed to
define the extent of United States jurisdiction in the Bering Sea
off the coast of Alaska. The District Attorney for the District of
Alaska had seized a British vessel more than three miles off the
coast in the Bering Sea for violation of the Act. Forfeiture proceedings commenced against the vessel were objected to on jurisdictional grounds. The issue ultimately became whether the District
of Alaska as used in the Act extended more than three miles from
the coast into the Bering Sea. The Court initially implied that the
Executive's positition would be controlling, but then qualified
these statements. Since international negotiations on the question
82.
83.
aptly
Tube
84.
85.

Act of August 18, 1856, ch. 164, 11 Stat. 119.
This interplay and conflict of the President and the Congress was most
described in Mr. Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet &
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
143 U.S. 472 (1892).
See note 102 infra and accompanying text.
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were pending, the Court felt that to decide whether the government's position was valid and to review the action of the political
branches of the government would be contrary to settled law. The
Court explicitly stated, however, that in certain circumstances it
would be obliged to render a judgment.
We are not to be understood, however, as underrating the weight of
the argument that in a case involving private rights, the court may
be obliged, if those rights are dependent upon the construction of
acts of Congress or of a treaty, and the case turns upon a question,
public in its nature, which has not been determined by the political
departments in the form of a law specifically settling it, or authorizing the executive to do so, to render judgment, "since we have no
more right to decline jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that
which is not given."86
The Court totally avoided deciding the issue, however, by holding
that the objections to jurisdiction had been waived at an earlier
stage. Nevertheless, the direct interests of foreign countries in the
outcome of the litigation militate more in favor of deference than
the situation in Jones.
The Court indicated a tendency toward a more independent
judgment on the question than found in any of the previous cases.
It appears that, in the case of the Executive's acting under a vague
statute, the court will determine the territorial extent of that 5tatute despite the presence of some international factors. As in the
past we see some of the same factors supporting a decision for
deference:
(1) the presence of a national of another country; and
(2) the existence of current international negotiations on the
question.
On the other hand the factors against deference were:
(1) the court was called on to interpret a domestic statute;
(2) individual property rights were at issue; and
(3) the United States was a party.
Subsequent to the erosion of the deference doctrine in the
Cooper case, the Supreme Court has avoided clarifying the role of
deference in territorial cases, except in the submerged lands cases.
An example of this avoidance is found in Vermilya-Brown Co. v.
86. 143 U.S. at 503.
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Connell. That case involved the question whether a United States
military base in Bermuda was a United States possession within
the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.1 The Department of State took the position that the arrangements under
which the United States leased the bases from Great Britain did
not, and were not intended to, transfer sovereignty over the leased
areas from Great Britain to the United States. The Court did not
want to disagree with this position, but was desirous of extending
the coverage of the Act. The solution was the tenuous theory that
"possession" as used in the Act did not require territorial sovereignty. Thus, the Court found that the base was a possession without dealing with the deference question, much as in In re Cooper.
Not only did the Court avoid the deference question, but it also
avoided all issues concerning international law.
In conclusion, although judicial deference is the stated rule in
cases involving the extent of United States territory and jurisdiction, an examination of the cases demonstrates that the rule is not
as rigid as it appears. The judiciary will feel constrained to defer
or avoid decision when the direct interests of foreign sovereigns are
involved in the litigation, especially if these rights are the subject
of a current dispute or negotiations. The Court, however, does not
seem to be as disposed toward deference if doing so would restrict
the rights of individual parties to the litigation. An additional
consideration is that it is well established that an administrative
interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to great deference. 9 Expanding this concept and
applying it to the State Department's interpretation of a treaty or
an international situation gives added impetus for judicial deference in cases that have significant foreign affairs overtones."
87. 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
88. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1946), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
89. E.g., Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); United States v. City of Chicago, 400 U.S.
8, 10 (1970); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
90. Alaska v. Arctic Maid involved the jurisdiction of Alaska to tax fishing
activities off its coast in the Bristol Bay area. In 1961, the United States Supreme
Court held that the tax was valid under the Commerce Clause as applied to fish
caught within Alaskan territorial waters. The Court expressed no opinion on the
question of the extent of Alaskan territorial waters in Bristol Bay and remanded
the case for a determination of the question. Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199
(1961). On remand, the Alaska Superior Court determined that Bristol Bay is a
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Conclusion

Throughout the discussion of cases in which deference has been
applied, various factors responsible for the application of the deference doctrine in derogation of the Court's responsibility to make
an independent judgment on a case before it have been pointed
out. It is clear, however, that the Supreme Court has never articulated a closed set of factors to make this determination but rather
has relied on vague perceptions of the separation of powers interests that should be preserved. This practice has resulted in a fluid
situation with marked aberrations. One area in which the deference question has not been properly addressed is the submerged
lands litigation. Before discussing the course of development of
that litigation, it would be helpful to set out those factors which
appear to have primarily influenced the Court in the areas of deference discussed above. From the review of the cases above it is
apparent that the courts rely strongly on certain factors. Others,
which recur regularly but have not been particularly emphasized
by the courts, also appear to have influenced the decisions.
The former factors are:
(1) whether an explicit constitutional allocation to the Executive exists;
(2) whether the judgment in the case may actually affect the
property or territorial rights claimed by a foreign nation;
(3) whether the judgment in the case may actually order a
foreign nation to do or not to do something;
(4) whether the judgment in the case may actually require
historic bay without receiving any communication from the federal government.
After learning of the decision, the Office of Legal Adviser authorized the Justice
Department to submit an amicus curiae brief indicating that the Bay is not.
historic waters. The brief was submitted to the Alaska Supreme Court where the
case was to be heard on appeal, but the parties settled before a judgment was
reached. Arctic Maid Fisheries, Inc. v. State, No. 316 (Alas. Sup. Ct., settled
April 1963). For a discussion of this case see 2 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 524-29

(1963). In the 1970 trials of four Cuban fishermen who allegedly violated the
United States twelve-mile exclusive fishery zone, however, the district court deferred to the Executive's position on the location of that zone. See, e.g., United
States v. Elisen Soto-Fuentes, No. 71-100-CR-WM (D. Fla., May 26, 1971). No
question of deference arose in Island Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 352 F.2d 735 (9th
Cir. 1965), which involved the question whether the waters between the Hawaiian
Islands were historic territorial sea.
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the federal government to do or not to do something vis-d-vis
another nation; and
(5) whether the Executive's position is authorized by statute.
The latter factors are:
(1) whether there are relatively strong legal standards present for deciding the issue;
(2) whether the United States is a party;
(3) whether the Executive's position is found in diplomatic
correspondence or formulated for the purpose of the litigation;
(4) whether the rights involved in the litigation are individual or public.
With these factors in mind, one can review the submerged lands
cases to determine how the courts have applied the deference doctrine in those cases.
I.

A.

THE SUBMERGED LANDS CASES

The Deference Doctrine in the Submerged Lands Cases

There have been twelve significant court decisions in the submerged lands dispute." A review of these cases will show that the
Supreme Court perceived at the outset that foreign relations matters were involved and, accordingly, exercised restraint in asserting
its independence of the Executive. This restraint was based primarily on the Court's perception that the decisions might determine the extent of United States territory and rights vis-A-vis other
nations. Accordingly, it accepted United States positions in the
litigations as fact. Later, this restraint began to be tempered by
the Court's recognition of the domestic aspects of these cases; the
most recent decisions minimize deference.
1. The First California Decision (1947).-The first submerged
91. United States v. Louisiana (Louisiana Boundary Case), 394 U.S. 11
(1969); United States v. Louisiana (Texas Boundary Case), 394 U.S. 1 (1969);
United States v. Lousiana (Texas), 389 U.S. 155 (1967); United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960); United
States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954);
United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
707 (1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v.
Alaska, 352 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alas. 1972); United States v. Alaska, 236 F. Supp.
388 (D. Alas. 1964).
Vol. 7-No. 2

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

lands case to be decided was United States v. California." This
original action in the Supreme Court involved the question
whether California or the United States has the right to exploit and
to regulate the seabed resources located seaward of the coastline
and landward of the limit of the territorial sea adjacent to California.13 In reaching the decision that these rights are possessed by
the United States, the Court relied heavily on the foreign relations
aspects of the litigation. It found that the rights to these resources
must reside in that arm of the sovereign that has control over
foreign relations:
The Government also appears in its capacity as a member of the
family of nations. In that capacity it is responsible for conducting
United States relations with other nations. It asserts that proper
exercise of these constitutional responsibilities requires that it have
power, unencumbered by state commitments, always to determine
what agreements will be made concerning the control and use of the
marginal sea and the land under it."
In accepting the Government's argument, the Court said:
The three-mile rule is but a recognition of the necessity that a government next to the sea must be able to protect itself from dangers
incident to its location. It must have powers of dominion and regulation in the interest of its revenues, its health, and the security of its
people from wars raged on or too near its coasts. And insofar as the
nation asserts its rights under international law, whatever of value
may be discovered in the seas next to its shores and within its
protective belt, will most naturally be appropriate for its use. But
whatever any nation does in the open sea, which detracts from its
common usefulness to nations, or which another nation may charge,
detracts from it, is a question for consideration among nations as
92. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
93. The United States territorial sea limit is a line that is: (1) at all times
three nautical miles seaward of: (a) the mean low-water line of islands and the
mainland; (b) the limits of inland waters defined by the closing line of rivers,
juridical bays, and historic inland water bays; (c) a system of straight baselines;
(d) the mean low-water lines of harbor works and jetties; (e) the mean low-water
line of low tide elevations which are within three nautical miles of (a), (b), (c) or
(d); or (2) the closing line of historic territorial sea waters. Although theoretically
part of the baseline, the United States maintains that there are no systems of
straight baselines or historic bays that affect the delimitation of the territorial sea
of the United States.
94. 332 U.S. at 29.
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such, and not their separate governmental units. What this nation
does, or even what the states do, anywhere in the ocean, is a subject
upon which the nation may enter into and assume treaty or similar
international obligations . . . . The very oil about which the state
and nation here contend might well become the subject of international dispute and settlement.
The ocean, even its three-mile belt, is thus of vital consequence
to the nation in its desire to engage in commerce and to live in peace
with the world; it also becomes of crucial importance should it ever
again become impossible to preserve the peace. And as peace and
world commerce are the paramount responsibilities of the nation,
rather than an individual state, so if wars come, they must be fought
by the nation . . . . The state is not equipped in our constitutional
system with the powers or the facilities for exercising the responsibilities which would be concomitant with the dominion which it
seeks. . . . [This] leads to the conclusion that national interests
responsibilities, and therefore national rights are paramount in the
waters lying to the seaward [of the inland waters] in the three-mile
belt."
There could be no stronger presentation of the foreign relations
interests that support the Court's deference to the Executive's
positions in the submerged lands controversy than was made in
that opinion.
The Court had occasion to defer to the Executive's position on

the existence and breadth of the territorial sea. In the course of its
opinion the Court determined that there was no territorial sea in

international law prior to the establishment of the United States
and that the United States territorial sea was first asserted by
Secretary of State Jefferson in 1793.06 The Court went on to defer
to that claim:
That the political agencies of this nation both claim and exercise
broad dominion and control over our three-mile marginal belt is now
a settled fact. Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122124. And this assertion of national dominion over the three-mile belt
is binding upon this Court. See Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202,
212-214; In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 502-503.11

95.
96.
97.

332 U.S. at 35-36.
332 U.S. at 33 n.16.
332 U.S. at 33-34.
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Thus, the Court's conclusion that the definition of the extent of
the territorial sea is related to the conduct of foreign affairs was
the primary basis for the holding that the United States had the
exclusive rights to the resources in dispute in the first California
case.'"
2. The FirstLouisiana Case (1950).-Since valuable oil deposits also lay off the Louisiana coast, it was necessary to ascertain
whether the first Californiadecision applied there. With little ceremony the Court found that California controlled and expressly
incorporated the reasoning of that case into this decision, which
limited Louisiana's rights to inland waters and areas landward of
the shoreline."
3. The First Texas Case (1950).-On the same date that the
first Louisiana decision was handed down, the Californiaholding
was applied to the coast of Texas."' An integral part of the previous cases was the finding that none of the states in question had
rights to the marginal sea area prior to its creation by the federal
government. The Texas situation was different. Texas argued that
prior to joining the Union it was an independent nation with a
nine-mile marginal sea. Despite this argument the Court found
that since Texas joined the Union on "equal footing" with the
other states, the factors articulated in the first Californiadecision
went so far as to work a divestiture on Texas.
4. Alabama v. Texas (1954).-No sooner had the first
California decision been handed down than there were calls in
Congress to "restore" the tidelands to the states.'"' This outcry
ultimately led to passage of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,1102
98. As a result of this decision the United States had possession of the resources in the three-mile belt of territorial sea. This area was defined in the
Court's decree as an area "underlying the Pacific Ocean lying seaward of the
ordinary low-water mark on the coast of California, and outside the inland waters,
extending three nautical miles . . . ." 332 U.S. at 805 (1947). Ultimately, it was
found necessary to appoint a special master to determine the location of the
baseline for the measurement of the territorial sea in order to locate this boundary
between the state and federal rights. United States v. California, 342 U.S. 891
(1951).
99. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950). The decree is found at
340 U.S. 899 (1950).
100. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). The decree is found at 340
U.S. 900 (1950).
101. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 28 n.44 (1960).
102. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1970). The Submerged Lands Act grants to
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which sought to give the coastal states the rights previously held
by the United States in the resources found within three miles of
the "coast line." There is an additional grant of up to nine miles
in the case of historic boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico. Two states,
Alabama and Rhode Island, sought to challenge the Submerged
Lands Act on the ground that the rights in the marginal sea are
attributes of the national sovereign power over foreign relations
and cannot be delegated to individual states. In a per curiam
opinion denying leave to file an original action,'"3 the Supreme
Court held that the interests are property of the United States that
can be disposed of without review pursuant to article IV, section 3
of the Constitution, which provides: "The Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory and other Property belonging to the
United States." No reference was made to the foreign relations
aspects of the case. The author of the first California decision,
Justice Black, and that of the first Louisianaand Texas decisions,
Justice Douglas, dissented from the decision, fearing that the
grants may have included aspects of the foreign relations power of
the states "title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within
the boundaries of the respective states, and the natural resources within such
lands and water ....

."

43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1) (1970). "Boundaries" for the

purposes of the Act include the seaward boundaries of a state "as they existed at
the time such State became a member of the Union, or approved by the Congress," but subject to the limitation that the term "boundaries" will not be
construed to extend from the coast line more than three geographic miles into the
Atlantic Ocean or more than three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico. 43
U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1970). Section 2(a) of the Act defines the term "lands beneath
navigable waters" as "(1) all lands within the boundaries of each of the respective
States which are covered by nontidal waters that were navigable under the laws
of the United States at the time such State became a member of the Union, or
acquired sovereignty over such lands and waters thereafter, up to the ordinary
high water mark as heretofore or hereafter modified by accretion, erosion, and
reliction; (2) all lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal waters up to
but not above the line of mean high tide and seaward to a line three geographical
miles distant from the coast line of each such State and to the boundary line of
each such State where in any case such boundary as it existed at the time such
State became a member of the Union, or as heretofore approved by Congress,
extends seaward (or into the Gulf of Mexico) beyond three geographical miles,
and (3) all filled in, made, or reclaimed lands which formerly were lands beneath
navigable waters, as hereinabove defined .

(1970).
103.

. . ."

Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
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the federal government."'" This decision thus marks a sharp turn
away from the strong foreign relations analysis of the submerged
05
lands controversy.'
5. The Second Louisiana Decision (1960).-In 1960, the Gulf
states pressed for a decision to determine which to them possess
the necessary historic boundaries to entitle them to the resources
of the Gulf up to nine miles from shore under the Submerged
Lands Act. The suit was an original action in the Supreme Court
styled United States of America v.States of Louisiana, Texas,
Mississippi,Alabama and Florida,No. 10 Original.' Only Texas
and Florida proved the necessary historical facts. For the purposes
of this paper, the significant factor was the role that the foreign
relations position of the United States did not play in this decision.
To receive rights beyond three miles the states had to locate
their state boundaries outside the three-mile limit as defined in the
Submerged Lands Act. The Submerged Lands Act defined the
state boundaries in question "as they existed at the time [a] State
became a member of the Union, or as heretofore approved by the
Congress . . . ."10 The United States argued that the language of
the statute necessarily prevents any state from obtaining any
rights beyond the three-mile limit. It argued that the terms of the
statute set the time for ascertaining the state boundary at a time
after statehood.'" On the basis of the previous cases the United
States argued that no state had a boundary beyond the coastline
because of the foreign relations aspects of the territorial sea. In
fact, the United States argued that not only had it never claimed
boundaries beyond the three-mile limit but that a holding by the
Court that any state had a boundary beyond three miles would be
embarrassing to the present conduct of United States foreign rela104. 347 U.S. at 277 (Black, J., dissenting), 281 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
105. This change can best illustrated by the most recent decision by the
Supreme Court in the third Louisiana decision of 1969. We still find Justices
Black and Douglas dissenting but their argument is very different: "There appears to be one thing certain about the problem, however, and that is that the
dispute between Louisiana and the United States is no part of international
affairs subject to international law, but is exclusively a domestic controversy
between the State and Nation." United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 81
(1969).
106. 363 U.S. 1 (1960) (as to Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi and Alabama); 363
U.S. 121 (1960) (as to Florida only).
107. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1970).
108. 363 U.S. at 11-13.
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tions."' The Court accepted the United States view on the time
that the boundary was to be determined but determined that a
state could have had boundaries beyond the coastline.
The Court's reasoning allowed it to reach this conclusion without
overruling its holdings in the first California,Louisiana and Texas
decisions. The Court introduced a new element into the picture
-Congress. It found that despite the foreign relations interests of
the Executive, Congress had set the boundaries of Florida and
Texas in the Gulf of Mexico out to a distance of approximately
nine miles." '0 The Court then implied that these states have no
right to enjoy the benefits of that boundary because of the Executive's foreign relations interests, which vest all rights in the area
in the federal government."'
Although this finding might be better viewed as a statement of
the limitations that the Executive can place on the states' use of
the area granted to them, it also provides the new conceptual basis
for the first California,Louisiana and Texas cases. Since the find109. 363 U.S. at 30. That argument was particularly appropriate as a result
of the imminent Law of the Sea Conference of 1960, which had as one of its agenda
items the matter of the breadth of the territorial sea. During the 1958 Conference
the United States had initially staunchly defended the three-mile limit, but had
later proposed as a compromise that six miles be accepted as the limit of territorial waters with an additional six-mile contiguous zone for exclusive fishing
rights. That proposal failed to win the necessary two-thirds vote in 1958, and
when proposed again in 1960 fell one vote short of the two-thirds requirement. For
a discussion of the 1960 Conference see Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on
the Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 751
(1960); Gormley, UnilateralExtension of TerritorialWaters, 43 U. DET. L.J. 695
(1966); Jessup, The Law of the Sea Around Us, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1961). The
failure of the compromise proposal at the 1960 Conference is one of the principal
causes for the present race to claim various areas in the ocean. Cf. W. BISHOP,
INTERNATIONAL LAW

595 (3d ed. 1971).

110. 363 U.S. at 64; 363 U.S. at 121.
111. "It is contended that since Texas was admitted to the Union with its
maritime boundary not yet settled, United States foreign policy on the extent of
territorial waters, to which Texas was admittedly subject from the moment of
admission, automatically upon admission operated to fix its seaward boundary
at three miles. This contention must be rejected. As we have noted, the boundaries contemplated by the Submerged Lands Act are those fixed by virtue of
Congressional power to admit new States and to define the extent of their territory, not by virtue of Executive power to determine this country's obligations visi-vis foreign nations . . . .It may indeed be that the Executive, in the exercise
of its power, can limit the enjoyment of certain incidents of a Congressionally
conferred boundary, but it does not fix that boundary." 363 U.S. at 51.
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ing of the Court was that at least Florida and Texas had boundaries outside the coastline from statehood, they necessarily possessed these during the period of the first submerged lands cases.
Executive interests in the foreign relations aspects of the litigation
articulated in those opinions, however, required that those boundary rights not be exercised. Only through the combined action of
Congress and the President culminating in the Submerged Lands
Act was that presumption of foreign affairs interests set aside,
subject to reassertion by the Executive. Nevertheless, the clear
fact is that the Executive's foreign affairs power in this area was
severely limited by the Submerged Lands Act through its interpretation by the Supreme Court.
Although on its face the recognition of state boundaries beyond
the three-mile territorial sea appeared to be internationally embarrassing to the United States, the practical effect was not. The
Submerged Lands Act purported to convey to the coastal states all
resource rights in the areas granted to the states. Since the Act did
not purport to claim for the United States vis-a-vis the rest of the
world any more rights than already held by the United States, the
Court viewed the Act as merely a domestic division of United
States resources." ' This conclusion is particularly valid in the case
of the resources that were the subject of the litigation. These resources were identified by the United States in its complaint seeking to quiet its "exclusive possession of, and full dominion and
power over, the lands, minerals, and other things underlying the
waters of the Gulf of Mexico more than three geographic miles
seaward from the coast of each State and extending to the edge of
the Continental Shelf.""" These rights include the exclusive right
112. 363 U.S. at 31.
113. 363 U.S. at 5. The Court pointed to the testimony of Jack B. Tate,
Deputy Legal Adviser to the State Department, before Congress to show the
purely domestic character of the issue: "He concluded that since the United
States had already asserted exclusive rights in the Continental Shelf as against
the world, the question to what extent those rights were to be exercised by the
Federal Government and to what extent by the States was one of wholly domestic
concern within the power of Congress to resolve." 363 U.S. at 31. President Truman, in a proclamation entitled Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed
of the ContinentalShelf, first asserted that "the Government of the United States
regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf
beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control." Presidential
Proclamation No. 2667, 59 Stat. 884 (1945). Under article 2, paragraph 1 of the
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of the coastal state to explore and exploit the natural resources of
the adjacent continental shelf.
After limiting this division of resources to a domestic question,
the Court admits of only one role for the foreign relations power of
the President as contrasted with congressional power on this question:
The power to admit new States resides in Congress. The President,
on the other hand, is the constitutional representative of the United
States in its dealings with foreign nations. From the former springs
the power to establish state boundaries; from the latter comes the
power to determine how far this country will claim territorial rights
in the marginal sea as against other nations. Any such determination is, of course, binding on the States."'
Thus, Congress can divide the resources of the continental shelf
any way it wants, and since the interests of no foreign nations are
recognized in those resources, there is no foreign relations interest
present.'"6. The Second California Decision (1965).-If the Congress had
picked an arbitrary line to divide the areas of the continental shelf
that are under state and federal control the submerged lands cases
might never have returned to foreign relations questions. Unfortunately, the baseline, from which the three- and nine-mile grants
under the Submerged Lands Act are measured, had to be identified in order to definitively locate the state-federal boundary. That
baseline was identified in the Act as the "coast line" and was
defined as "the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf, it is recognized that "the coastal State
exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
it and exploiting its natural resources." Convention on the Continental Shelf,
opened for signature April 29, 1958, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499
U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964).
114. 363 U.S. at 35.
115. After the 1960 Louisiana decision the pressure was off the parties to
determine the exact limits of the Submerged Lands Act grant off Texas because
oil exploitation was not near the nine-mile line. There was more pressure in the
case of Louisiana. As an interim measure a decree was entered setting up various
zones of responsibility between the United States and Louisiana pending a final
location of the three-mile Submerged Lands Act grant. United States v. Louisiana, 364 U.S. 502 (1960). During the period following the decision the United
States Coast and Geodetic Survey prepared large scale maps under joint supervision of the parties for use in locating that boundary.
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coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line
marking the seaward limit of inland waters.""'
A 1965 opinion in the second Californiacase became the vehicle
for a Supreme Court interpretation of this term."' After a review

of the legislative history of the Submerged Lands Act, the Court
found that it had great discretion in determining what that term
meant:
Congress, in passing the Act, left the responsibility for defining
inland waters to this Court. We think that it did not tie our hands
at the same time. Had Congress wished us simply to rubber-stamp
the statements of the State Department as to its policy in 1953, it
could readily have done so itself. It is our opinion that we best fill
our responsibility of giving content to the words which Congress
employed by adopting the best and most workable definitions available."'
The Court first turned to the definition of "inland waters." A
review of its 1947 California opinion clearly indicated that this
definition was to have an international content since the outer
limits of inland waters would determine the country's international coastline, but the Court in that earlier case did not specify
further."9
Apparently, the Court felt that the conclusion reached by the
Special Master appointed in the first California case did not provide the best definition for its purposes.' It was not until the late
116. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1970).
117. United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965).
118. 381 U.S. at 164-65.
119. 381 U.S. at 162.
120. The Special Master found that there was no internationally accepted
definition for inland waters and decided in those circumstances that the position
taken by the United States in the conduct of foreign affairs should be controlling.
He concluded that the relevant date on which to determine our foreign policy to
be October 27, 1947, the date of the California decree. He therefore rejected the
assertion that letters from the State Department, written in 1951 and 1952, declaring the then present policy of the United States, were conclusive on the
question before him. At the same time, that decision required the Special Master
to consider a great deal of foreign policy materials dating back to 1793 in an
attempt to discern a consistent thread of United States policy on the definition
of inland waters. He ultimately decided that as of 1947 the United States had
taken the position that a bay was an inland water only if the distance between
the headlands of the bay was less than ten miles and a closing line drawn across
the mouth of the bay enclosed a sufficient water area to satisfy the Boggs formula,
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1950's and early 1960's that a better definition was presented. In
1958, the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea approved the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 21 The
United States ratified the Convention in 1961 and it came into
force in 1964."' The Convention's definition of inland waters was
in part a codification of the previous international definition and
in part progressive development of international law. Articles three
through thirteen provide rules for delineating the baseline from
which the territorial sea is measured. Once the baseline of a coastal
nation is determined, all waters located landward of that baseline
form part of the inland waters of the nation. In addition, the Convention provides that certain bays 2 1 that belong exclusively to a
coastal nation are considered part of the inland waters of that
nation. The Court adopted this definition for use in "giving content to the words which Congress employed" in 1953.12
which is a reduced area formula similar to the semi-circle test described in note
123 supra. (The Boggs formula is described in Boggs, Delimitation'ofthe Territorial Sea, 24 Am. J. INT'L L. 551 (1930)). The Report of the Special Master is
printed in full in I A. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 329-53 (1962).
121. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for
signature April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.
205 (Sept. 10, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Convention].
122. 381 U.S. at 164.
123. Article 7, paragraph 2 of the Convention defines a bay as a "well-marked
indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as
to contain landlocked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the
coast. An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is
as large as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn
across the mouth of that indentation." Convention, art. 7, 2. In addition, if the
distance between the headlands of the bay does not exceed 24 miles, the bay shall
be considered inland waters. Convention, art. 7, 4. If the distance of this closing
line is greater than 24 miles, a straight base line of 24 miles may be drawn within
the bay in a manner designed to enclose the maximum area, which shall then be
considered a bay. Under paragraph 6, article 7 does not apply to historic bays,
which are discussed at note 178 infra and accompanying text.
124. 381 U.S. at 165. "The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, approved by the Senate and ratified by the President, provides such
definitions. We adopt them for purposes of the Submerged Lands Act. This establishes a single coastline for both the administration of the Submerged Lands Act
and the conduct of our future international relations (barring an unexpected
change in the rules established by the Convention). Furthermore the comprehensiveness of the Convention provides answers to many of the lesser problems related to coastlines which, absent the Convention, would be most troublesome."
381 U.S. at 165.
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This decision then appeared to bring the submerged lands cases
full circle back to giving international content to the boundary
between the states and the federal government by making the
Submerged Lands Act grant directly dependent on the territorial
sea boundary the United States claims vis-A-vis other nations. The
Court slightly lessened the international overtones, however, by
holding that the definition now chosen would be frozen and would
not change if the Convention were changed.'2 In responding to
California's argument that the decision might inhibit the United
States in the conduct of foreign relations, the Court replied that
"'[f]reezing' the meaning of 'inland waters' in terms of the Convention definition largely avoids this, and also serves to fulfill the
requirements of definiteness and stability which should attend any
congressional grant of property rights belonging to the United
States."'
Later, the Court turned to the second part of the definition of
the "coast line" utilized by the Submerged Lands Act, which relates to the "line of ordinary low-water.""'2 It again found the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone convenient
in giving content to that phrase and adopted the low-water line
used in article 3: "the low water line along the coast as marked on
large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State."'' 1
Since the Coast and Geodetic Survey depicted the "lower low
water line" on its charts of the California coast, that line was
adopted for use under the Submerged Lands Act in California.'2 '
From the Court's general conclusions it would have been difficult to determine its perception of the role of the Executive's foreign affairs power in the location of the Submerged Lands Act
"coast line" as then defined by the Court. Two facts, however,
were clear.
First, as of the date of the decision the coast line for use in the
Submerged Lands Act was coincident with the baseline that the
United States used in claiming its territorial sea vis-A-vis other
countries. Thus, a judicial location of the coast line might determine the extent of United States territorial sea claimed as of May
17, 1965.
125.

381 U.S. at 166-67.

126. 381 U.S. 167.
127. 381 U.S. at 176.
128.
129.

Convention, art. 3.
381 U.S. at 176.
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Secondly, to locate the coast line the Court would have to interpret the terms of a treaty to which the United States and many
foreign nations were parties.
Accordingly, two areas in which the Court has traditionally applied the deference doctrine became relevant-the extent of the
territory of the United States and the interpretation of international agreements. The remainder of this second California decision and much of the third Louisiana decision provide answers to
the question of what role the Court perceived deference had in
these cases. Apparently, deference has played a role in only two
aspects of these issues-straight baselines and historic bays.
In part IV of the second Californiaopinion, entitled "Subsidiary
Issues," the Court dealt with six issues: (1) straight baselines; (2)
24-mile closing rule; (3) historic inland waters; (4) harbors and
roadsteads; (5) the line of ordinary low water; and (6) artificial
accretions. Since the fifth has already been discussed, the first four
and the sixth will be discussed below in terms of the deference
doctrine.
(a) Straight Baselines.-In 1947, there was no concept of a
system of straight baselines for use in delimiting the territorial sea.
It was first recognized as a valid technique in the International
Court of Justice Fisheries Case'3 and was later codified in article
four of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone.'" That doctrine permits the coastal state under certain geographical circumstances to substitute for the low-water line and
the outer limit of inland water of bays and rivers a series of straight
lines drawn arbitrarily by the coastal nation between points on the
low-water line of that nation's coasts.
California argued that it has the proper geographical configuration for drawing a system of straight baselines on its coast and
should be allowed to do so. The Court summarily rejected this
for adopting such a system
claim and placed the sole responsibility
32
on the federal government.
The first question reached in making that determination was to
ascertain whether the Convention requires the drawing of straight
baselines or merely makes it optional. The United States argued
that it was merely permissive and the Court agreed. Interestingly,
130.
131.
132.

Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. 116.
Convention, art. 4.
381 U.S. 167-68.
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no mention of deference to the Executive's position on the matter
is found.
The second question was whether California or the federal government would make a decision to adopt a system of straight baselines. California argued that its coast has the necessary configuration to allow the use of this system and that the Constitution gives
the states the power to draw their boundaries so long as they are
within the limits recognized by international law. This proposition
was rejected. However, the Court's reasons were solely related to
the foreign relations impact of such a boundary decision:
The national responsibility for conducting our international relations obviously must be accommodated with the legitimate interests
of the States in the territory over which they are sovereign. Thus a
contraction of a State's recognized territory imposed by the Federal
Government in the name of foreign policy would be highly questionable. But an extension of state sovereignty to an international area
by claiming it as inland water would necessarily also extend national sovereignty, and unless the Federal Government's responsibility for questions of external sovereignty is hollow, it must have
the power to prevent States from so enlarging themselves. We conclude that the choice under the Convention to use the straightbaseline method for determining inland waters claimed against
other nations is one that rests with the Federal Government, and not
with the individual States.'3
Thus, the Court perceived the foreign relations interests to be
sufficiently strong to require that the extension of the United
States claims in the oceans by use of a system of straight baselines
be made only by the federal government.
(b) Twenty-four Mile Closing Rule.-Although the Submerged
Lands Act was passed when international law recognized only a 10mile closing line for bays, the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone definition of inland waters extended the
closing line for bays to 24 miles. 34 There was little question
whether the distance between headlands of particular bays in issue
met the 24-mile requirement. A greater problem arose in determining what configuration constitutes a bay. This question arose in the
context of the Santa Barbara Channel where the most valuable oil
resources lie. California argued that the Channel is a "fictitious
133. 381 U.S. at 168.
134. See note 123 supra.
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bay" formed by the mainland and the islands south of the Channel.,:1
The dispute centered around the question whether the fictitious
bay theory is a bona fide theory for delimiting the baseline. California argued that it is and that it is automatically the baseline as in
the case of the low-water line. The Court could have decided the
question on the basis of an interpretation of the Convention or on
the basis of general international law. The Court, however, viewed
this situation as similar to the straight baseline question and deferred to the United States. It first stated: "The United States
asserts that 'international law recognizes no principle of "fictitious
bays."' We find it unnecessary to decide that question."' 3 Later
in the opinion the Court concludes this question:
The United States has not in the past claimed the Santa Barbara
Channel as inland water and opposes any such claim now. The
channel has not been regarded as a bay either historically or geographically. In these circumstances, as with the drawing of straight
base lines, we hold that if the United States does not choose to
employ the concept of a "fictitious bay" in order to extend our
international boundaries around the islands framing Santa Barbara
Channel, it cannot be forced to do so by California. 7
Thus, the holding was that the United States position on the territorial extent of the United States vis-A-vis other countries was
binding on the Court.
(c) Historic Inland Waters.-The Court will defer when considering historic inland waters. In this section the Court dealt with
waters that did not qualify as 24-mile bays but with waters that
California claimed on the internationally recognized ground that
the "coastal nation has traditionally asserted and maintained
dominion with the acquiescence of foreign nations." ' Santa Monica and San Pedro Bays remained to be discussed in this section.
During the course of the Special Master's hearings in the first
California case California had introduced state statutes and one
court case for each bay which purported to show that California
has historically treated these bays as inland waters. The Special
Master found that the statutes were ambiguous and that the cases
135. 381 U.S. at 170.
136. 381 U.S. at 170 n.38.

137. 381 U.S. at 172.
138. 381 U.S. at 172.
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and statutes were insufficient evidence to establish the historical
claim. The Master found it unnecessary to determine whether he
was required to defer to the Executive's position on the matter
because he decided in favor of the federal government without
9
deferring.

3

The Supreme Court approved the Master's decision on the
matter after indicating that California's evidence was even less
probative than the Master had indicated."' As to the statutes the
Court found that legislative claims without actual proof of implementation are insufficient to support a historic bay claim. The case
involving San Pedro Bay was found to have been dismissed and,
thus, was actually evidence that jurisdiction had not been exercised. The Santa Monica Bay case was successfully prosecuted but
was found to be insufficient to support independently the historic
bay claim.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court had no reason to determine
whether deference was required. In an effort to clarify the matter,
however, it indicated that deference was required in these cases:
The United States disclaims that any of the disputed areas are
historic inland waters. We are reluctant to hold that such a disclaimer would be decisive in all circumstances, for a case might arise
in which the historic evidence was clear beyond doubt. But in the
case before us, with its questionable evidence of continuous and
exclusive assertions of dominion over the disputed waters, we think
the disclaimer decisive.'
The degree of deference required by the Court in this passage is
not at all clear. It is apparent that the deference is at least as great
as the "great weight" rule found in other areas. Apparently, it is
even stronger than that. The phrase "clear beyond doubt," how4 2
ever, is seldom employed.

139. The entire Master's report is reprinted in I A.
329-53 (1962).

SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA

BOUNDAEs

140. 381 U.S. at 173.
141 381 U.S. at 175.
142. The only case I am aware of in which the phrase was used is Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, considered the Government's argument that possession of marijuana gave rise to the
inference that the possessor knew that the marijuana had been imported or
brought into the country illegally. In rejecting the inference as "forced and baseless," Justice Black stated that "[ilt
is clear beyond doubt that the fact of
possession alone is not enough to support an inference that the possessor knew it
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(d) Harbors and Roadsteads.-This question revolved solely
around the completeness of the adoption of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Although the Submerged
Lands Act does not speak of harbors and roadsteads as part of the
coast line for the measurement of the grant of resources, the Court
followed its policy of making the "coast line" identical to the baseline used in the Convention and incorporated it in the Submerged
43
Lands Act.
(e) ArtificialAccretions.-Similarly, since the Court held that
international law permits the coastal state to change the territorial
sea baseline through artificial changes in the low-water line, such
changes were allowed in the case of the Submerged Lands Act
grant. The only additional development in this section is that the
low-water line apparently would not be frozen at the date of the
decision but would change as the low-water line is modified."'
Thus, the result of this second Californiadecision is that so long
as the United States does not change its position internationally
on the baseline for the measurement of the territorial sea, that
baseline will be identical to the coast line as used by the Submerged Lands Act. Since the Court assumes that it must defer to
the Executive on the determinations of the location of the limits
of the territory of the United States, it would have to defer to the
Executive on questions relating to the location of the coastline
under the Submerged Lands Act.
7. The Third Louisiana Decision (1969).-It took the State of
Louisiana and the United States almost four years to join issue on
the questions remaining between them based on the second
California decision. As in the first Louisiana decision, Louisiana
argued that the previous Californiadecision did not apply to it.
The Court rejected this contention and moved on to apply its
second Californiadecision to the Louisiana coast. 4 ' The remainder
had been imported." 395 U.S. at 55 (Black, J., concurring). Equating "clear
beyond doubt" with "forced and baseless" indicates that the Government's disclaimer will probably be accepted unless it is baseless.
143. 381 U.S. at 175. Article 8 of the Convention states that for the purpose
of delimiting the territorial sea, "the outermost permanent harbour works which
form an integral part of the harbour system shall be regarded as forming part of
the coast." Convention, art. 8.
144. 381 U.S. at 177.
145. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 34 (1969). It would appear that
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stare decisis would limit the claims of all the coastal states to the coastline and
the area granted to them by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. However, the
decisions are not res judicata with respect to the coastal states from Maine to
Georgia, Washington, Oregon, and Hawaii. This limitation is res judicata for the
Gulf States (Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana and Texas) because of the
submerged lands decisions under discussion. Collateral estoppel would appear to
similarly limit the claims of the State of Alaska as a result of the decisions in
United States v. Alaska, 236 F. Supp. 388 (1964), and United States v. Alaska,
352 F. Supp. 815 (1972). Although Hawaii has not participated in any of the
submerged lands cases to date, there has been one case involving its rights to the
adjacent seas that would be stare decisis in a more particular way than the
Californiacase. That case was Island Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 352 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.
1965).
The East coast states from Maine to Georgia have challenged the California
decision in United States v. Maine, 398 U.S. 947 (1970). Initially, the State of
Florida was included in this case and in the case of United States v. Louisiana,
(Louisiana Boundary Case), 394 U.S. 11 (1969). Due to its unique situation of
having coasts on both the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean and having the
previous decisions in the Louisiana case res judicata as to it, Florida was severed
from the Maine case. A new case, United States v. Florida, No. 52 Original, was
then created. 403 U.S. 949, 950 (1971).
The issues in the Florida case revolve around the location of the limits of
Florida's rights in the adjacent seas as established by its original constitution, the
Congress' act of readmission, recent state boundary descriptions and the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. The Supreme Court failed to act on the United States
motion for summary judgment in the consolidated case, and subsequently the
Floridacase was submitted to the same special master who is sitting on the Maine
case, Albert B. Mars, to hear evidence and submit a report. 403 U.S. at 950. On
January 18, 1974, the Special Master issued his final report on the Floridacase.
Report of the Special Master, United States v. Florida, No. 52 Original. In the
report the Special Master limited Florida's rights to the seas to three geographical
miles from the coastline in the Atlantic Ocean and three marine leagues in the
Gulf. Id. at 18. Except in the case of a closing line for Florida Bay, his conclusions
result in a boundary line that is coincident with that urged by the United States
in the litigation. Id. at 18-21. It even appears that in the one case of divergence
he misconstrued the United States position to be the one he adopted. Id. at 39.
There were four areas in the Florida case where deference might have arisen:
(1) the location of the Florida boundary on readmission to the Union; (2) the
existence of historic bays; (3) the existence of straight baselines; and (4) the
location of the normal baseline. The Special Master only considered deference in
the case of historic bay claims and straight baseline claims although all four issues
concerned the location of United States claims in the seas.
In the case of the historic bay claim to an area eastward of a line between the
Dry Tortugas and Cape Romano, the Special Master applied the clear beyond
doubt test and found Florida's evidence lacking. Id. at 36-47. Finally, the Special
Master determined that the federal government has the option to adopt straight
baselines to define and locate Florida's coastline, and found no such baselines
established by the United States. Id. at 49.
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of the opinion can be analyzed under three conceptual headings:
(1) straight baselines; (2) historic bays; and (3) minor interpretations of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone. Within this organization three different levels of deference,
ranging from almost complete deference to no deference at all are
present. What is not present is the complete deference found in
parts of the first and second Californiadecisions.
(a) Straight Baselines.-In its discussion of the theory of
straight baselines the Court reaffirmed its strong deference to the
Executive on the matter:
Since the United States asserts that it has not drawn and does not
want to draw straight baselines along the Louisana coast, that disclaimer would, under the California decision, be conclusive of the
matter.
While we agree that the straight baseline method was designed for
precisely such coasts as the Mississippi River Delta area, we adhere
to the position that the selection of this optional method of establishing boundaries should be left to the branches of Government
responsible for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. It would be inappropriate for this Court to review or overturn
the considered decision of the United States, albeit partially motivated by a domestic concern, not to extend its borders to the furthest extent consonant with international law.'46
In a footnote to that statement, however, the Court indicated
that this deference was not as complete as one might think. Louisiana argued that the "Chapman Line," the line that had been
used to depict the coast line of Louisiana for purposes of the submerged lands litigation and that was used as a basis for the early
interim agreement, constituted a system of straight baselines for
the coast of Louisiana. In allowing Louisiana to argue the straight
baseline claim before a new Special Master the Court said:
If that had been the consistent official international stance of the
Government, it arguably could not abandon that stance solely to
gain advantage in a lawsuit to the detriment of Louisiana. Cf.
United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 168: "[A] contraction of

a State's recognized territory imposed by the Federal Government
in the name of foreign policy would be highly questionable." We do
not intend to preclude Louisiana from arguing before the Special
146.

394 U.S. at 72-73.
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Master that, until this stage of the lawsuit, the United States had
actually drawn its international boundaries in accordance with the
principles and methods embodied in Article 4 of the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone." 7
Thus, the way was opened for a showing that would override the
position the United States took in this litigation. However, it was
not clear whether the only federal positions that were due deference were those actually made in the course of the Executive's
conduct of international relations or whether new positions expressed in court merely for the benefit of the United States in the
submerged lands cases also were to be followed.
The Court did have the opportunity to apply its ruling on the
straight baselines question in an earlier portion of the opinion that
dealt with a navigational line drawn by the Commandant of the
Coast Guard.' Louisiana had argued and continues to argue that
the Commandant's line is the territorial boundary of Louisiana.
The Court construed the argument as being founded on both a
straight baseline claim and an historic bay claim' and ultimately
decided that it is not a straight baseline; the interesting aspect,
however, is the method by which the Court made the determination. The Court did not merely defer to the position of the United
States in the litigation; rather, it devoted a great deal of analysis
to the administration of the line and to the extrajudicial statements of the relevant federal officers to determine how the line was
treated. From that history the Court determined that the line had
not been treated by the United States as a territorial limit." Thus,
it was not a system of straight baselines.
147. 394 U.S. at 74 n.97.
148. In drawing this line the Commandant of the Coast Guard was acting
pursuant to his authority "to designate and define by suitable bearings or ranges
with light houses, light vessels, buoys or coast objects, the lines dividing the high
seas from rivers, harbors and inland waters." Act of February 19, 1895, 28 Stat.
672. This authority was originally granted to the Secretary of the Treasury, but
was successively transferred to various agencies and finally to the Commandant
of the Coast Guard in 1967. 49 C.F.R. § 1.4(a)(2).
149. No reference is made to straight baselines in the discussion, but it is
apparent that the concept was at the heart of the court's discussion. Since Louisiana's claim was obviously based, in part, on such a claim, the treatment of the
question without the application of the almost complete deference approach theoretically applicable to straight baselines indicates a further erosion of deference
in such instances.
150. 394 U.S. at 22.
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Therefore, this most recent consideration of the straight baseline
question indicates that the deference doctrine is applicable but
that the Court will make its own independent judgment to determine whether the disclaimer conforms with the actual position of
the United States in its foreign relations. In the hearings before the
Special Master appointed after the decision under discussion,
Louisiana continues to make straight baseline claims, based5
primarily on the Commandant's line and the Chapman line.' '
Regardless of the apparent disposition of the question in this
opinion, it is clear that the Supreme Court will have to face these
questions again.
(b) Historic Bays.-Louisiana, following the example of California, fell back on a historic bay claim to support its claim over
many areas on its coast. The Supreme Court clearly indicated that
the "clear beyond doubt" formulation was still viable and applicable to the coast of Louisiana.'5 2 However, the Court did add a
number of qualifications to the ruling.
First, as in its ruling on straight baselines, the Court warned the
Government about trying to rewrite history. The Court construed
the United States argument to be "that it can prevent judicial
recognition of a ripened claim to historic title merely by lodging a
disclaimer with the court." 5 ' The Court cut this argument short
by pointing out that the clear beyond doubt rule is not as complete
as that provided for in the case of straight baselines.5 4
Secondly, the Court also freed itself from an executive determination concerning which facts were relevant to the creation of a
historic bay claim. One of the major issues was the relevance of
state exercises of authority over disputed waters to support proof
of a historic bay. The United States argued that it must affirmatively adopt the state action as its own before the state action can
be considered by the Court. The Court disagreed and held that the
state action would stand as actions of the nation to be considered
in determining whether the claims and exercises of jurisdiction
combined with foreign activities are sufficient to establish a historic inland water bay.
151. The author represented the United States before the Special Master on
matters referred to the Master by the instant opinion. The order of reference is
found at 403 U.S. 950 (1971).
152. 394 U.S. at 77.
153. 394 U.S. at 76.
154. 394 U.S. at 77.
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[It] would be inequitable in adapting the principles of international law to the resolution of a domestic controversy, to permit the
National Government to distort those principles, in the name of its
power over foreign relations and external affairs, by denying any
effect to past events. The only fair way to apply the Convention's
recognition of historic bays to this case, then, is to treat the claim
of historic waters as if it were being made by the national sovereign
and opposed by another nation. To the extent the United States
could rely on state activities in advancing such a claim, they are
'
relevant to the determination of the issue in this case. u
Thirdly, unlike the straight baseline question, the international
law standards for the establishment of a historic bay are not found
in any convention. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone merely refers to customary international law.',"
In recognition of the imprecise nature of the doctrine, the Court
in the California case had referred the matter to the Special Master.' 7 In this third Louisiana decision, the Court had occasion to
consider the question further. In that discussion, there is no mention of deference to the Executive on the question of what the
international standards are or how they are applied by the United
States. The implication is that the Court will function independently on such a question of customary international law in the
submerged lands cases.
Thus, in discussing the question whether the line drawn by the
Commandant of the Coast Guard established historic waters landward of the line, the Court looked to two recent United Nations
studies' '8 to identify the standards required for proving historic
waters. It then reviewed the facts relating to the administration of
the line to determine whether it met those standards.
The standard the Court established was that which is required
to establish historic inland waters. This standard requires at a
minimum that there be proof that the "coastal nation has traditionally asserted and maintained dominion with the acquiescence
of foreign nations.""'5 This maintenance of dominion must include
the prohibition of innocent passage in order to elevate the claim
155. 394 U.s. at 77-78.
156. Convention, art. 7, 6.
157. 394 U.S. at 75; 381 U.S. at 143 n.3.
158. See note 219 infra.
159. 394 U.S. at 23. The Court quoted from United States v. California, 381
U.S. 139, 172 (1965).
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from one over a historic territorial sea to that of historic inland
waters."" It will be remembered that it is the limit of inland waters
that is relevant to the location of the Submerged Lands Act grant.
In its review of the Commandant's line the Court found that the
only exercise of authority was that of reasonable regulation of navigation, which it found "not alone a sufficient exercise of dominion
to constitute a claim to historic inland waters."' 6 ' Furthermore, it
found numerous extrajudicial disclaimers by federal officials indicating that the line had no other significance than for use in navigation.' 12 Thus, the court concluded: "But even if a nation could
base a claim to historic inland waters on its continuous regulation
of navigation, it is clear that no historic title can accrue when the
coastal nation disclaims any territorial reach by such an exercise
of jurisdiction."'6 3 Finally, it referred to the clear beyond doubt
rule articulated in the California decision and found this claim
wanting.'
If any conclusion concerning the historic bay question can be
reached from this case, it is that the Court has become suspicious
of the United States in the litigation and will closely scrutinize any
disclaimer to determine whether it is consistent with the way the
United States has treated the waters historically. The degree of
deference continues to appear to be academic, since the Supreme
Court has never found a bay to be historic inland waters in the face
of a disclaimer.
(c) Minor interpretationsof the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone.-In part II of this third Louisiana
decision the Court turned to the task of interpreting the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone for application
to the Louisiana coast. In addition to the matters discussed above,
the six remaining issues were: (1) dredged channels; (2) the territorial sea of low-tide elevations; (3) the semi-circle test; (4) islands
at the mouth of a bay; (5) islands as headlands of bays; and (6)
fringes of islands. All these questions could be resolved by a legal
analysis of the Convention and its preparatory papers. 6 Although
160. 394 U.S. at 24 & n.28.
161. 394 U.S. at 24.
162. 394 U.S. at 29.
163. 394 U.S. at 26-27.
164. 394 U.S. at 28-29.
165. Those papers are found in the Yearbook of the InternationalLaw ComVol. 7-No. 2
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the resolution of these questions would have the same impact of
determining this nation's territorial claims vis-A-vis other nations
as straight baselines, the Court interpreted the Convention without any mention of deference to the Executive. In fact, for the first
time in this series of cases the Court admittedly ruled against the
United States on a question that might affect the location of the
territorial sea.
(1) dredge channels.-Louisiana argued that submerged
dredged channels should be used as part of the baseline on the
ground that they are harbor works, which under article 8 of
the Convention are part of the coast. 6 The United States
argued that they could not be used and prevailed in this dis67
pute.1
(2) the territorialsea of low-tide elevations.-The United
States argued that low-tide elevations within three miles of a
bay closing line and more than three miles from a mean lowwater line of the mainland or an island could not be used to
extend the territorial sea.'68 The Court found the limits of bays
to be assimilated into the mainland and determined contrary
to the United States position that such an elevation would
69
extend the territorial sea.
(3) the semi-circle test. -The issue here revolved around the
treatment of small bays found along the shore of a larger bay.
The Court decided contrary to the United States position and
permitted an expansive use of these bays to increase the water
area of the larger bay for determining whether a closing line
mission for the years 1950 through 1958. [1950-58] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A (1950-58). The records of the 1958 Geneva Conference on the
Law of the Sea are found in the Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/37-43.
166. See note 143 supra.
167. 394 U.S. at 38.
168. Article 11 of the Convention provides: "1. A low-tide elevation is a
naturally-formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at lowtide but submerged at high tide. Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly
or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the
mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the
baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea. 2. Where a low-tide
elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial
sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own." Convention, art. 11.

169. 394 U.S. at 47.
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could be drawn at its mouth. 7 ' In addition, a number of subsidiary issues relating to the closing of such subsidiary bays
and the use of beach erosion jetties were decided against the
United States in footnote 64.171
(4) islands at the mouth of a bay.-This issue involved the
question of the location of the closing line of a bay where
islands are located in the mouth of the bay. Louisiana had
argued that the closing line from which the three-mile grant
is to be measured should be lines connecting the seaward
extension of the islands. The United States argued that the
lines should connect the geographical natural entrance points
of the bay in each of the passes between the islands in question. The Court held in favor of the United States and referred.
the question of particular delimitation to the Special Mas72
ter.

(5) islands as headlands of bays.-This issue involved the
use of islands rather than the mainland as the headland of a
bay for drawing the closing line marking the limit of inland
waters. The Court determined that such islands may be used
if they are virtually part of the mainland. The factors for
determining this question were presented but the decision
173
here is inconclusive.

(6) fringes of islands.-Louisiana argued that fringes of islands would enclose inland waters. The Court found that such
fringes did not fit the Convention's definition of bays and
determined that they could form inland waters only if the
coastal nation adopted a system of straight baselines. 174 Since

the straight baseline question is still unresolved, the United
States won a partial victory here.
The net result of the third Louisiana decision seems to be an
erosion of the deference doctrine as applied to the submerged lands
cases. There is no doubt, however, that it is still present. Subsequent to issuing this opinion, the Court referred the unresolved
Louisiana matters to a Special Master, Memphis attorney Walter
170. The semi-circle test is discussed at note 123 supra.
171. 394 U.S. at 48 n.64.

172. 394 U.S. at 60.
173. 394 U.S. at 60-66.
174. 394 U.S. at 71.
Vol. 7-No. 2

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

P. Armstrong, Jr.'75 He has held extensive evidentiary hearings and
received post-trial briefs of the parties. Whatever his decision, it
is expected that the parties will take exception to it in the Supreme
Court.
8. The Cook Inlet Case (1972).-Only two submerged lands
cases have not been brought as original actions in the Supreme
Court. Both of these were brought in the federal District Court for
the District of Alaska by the United States against the State of
Alaska. The first case to be decided involved the status of Yakutat
Bay on the coast of Alaska. It resulted in a 1964 decision by the
district court holding that the limit of inland waters was a ten-mile
closing line inside the bay.'76 This decision was reversed on the
authority of the second California decision, which established a
twenty-four mile closing line, which closed the entire bay.'77
The other case was filed a year before the Yakutat Bay case but,
because of its complexity, took ten years to reach a district court
decision. 178 The case focused on the question whether Cook Inlet
was a historic inland water bay with the result that all the seabed
resources of Cook Inlet and an area three miles seaward of its
closing line were subject to Alaska's jurisdiction. Although the
court's decision is being appealed, this case is worth discussing for
two reasons. First, it is the only submerged lands decision dealing
with substantive matters subsequent to the third Louisiana decision. Secondly, the court found Cook Inlet to be a historic inland
water bay in spite of a disclaimer by the United States.
As in the third Louisiana decision, the court's handling of the
relationship of the court to the Executive's foreign relations power
will be discussed first and then its treatment of the specific issue
at hand, Cook Inlet. The court acknowledged the obligation placed
on it by the Supreme Court that, in the face of a disclaimer by the
United States, it must find the evidence to establish a historic bay
clear beyond doubt to decide contrary to the disclaimer.' 0 It is
clear, however, that the court neither followed this injunction nor
understood it. As demonstrated above, the sole basis for the lever175. United States v. Louisiana, 395 U.S. 901 (1969).
176. United States v. Alaska, 236 F. Supp. 388 (D. Alas. 1964).
177. United States v. Alaska, 353 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1965).
178. United States v. Alaska, 352 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alas. 1972). The author
conducted the pretrial discovery and trial stages of this case for the United States.
179. 352 F. Supp. at 818.
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age given the United States is that the determinations in the submerged lands cases, in effect, might determine the extent of United
States territory vis-A-vis other nations. Thus, a decision adverse to
the United States could have an impact on the conduct of foreign
relations by the Executive. The court ignores this fact by making
the circular argument that its finding that Cook Inlet is historic
inland waters means that the United States has always claimed it
as such; thus, the decision is not contrary to the United States
foreign relations position.
The United States has advanced the argument that a decision by
this Court upholding historic title substantially would interfere with
the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive branch of government. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Court sees
no merit in that contention. . . . As the evidence clearly establishes, the United States has long considered all of Cook Inlet to be
historic inland waters.'80
What the court is saying is that it is to act as the determiner of
the United States foreign relations position. If the United States
postion as found by the court is contrary to the United States
stated position in the litigation, there is no embarrassment to the
United States internationally. This would be because the court's
decision would be consistent with the United States actual foreign
relations position. Carrying the court's reasoning to its logical end,
deference would not be approprate in any of the subject areas
previously discussed in this paper. For example, if a question before the court was one of sovereign immunity, no deference would
be required because the court would have access to the facts establishing ownership and use of the property in question and could
make its own determination of whether sovereign immunity is
applicable. However, the present practice is to defer to executive
statements of sovereign immunity without requiring proof of ownership or use. The reason apparently is that the interests of foreign
relations require that the court follow present government positions regardless of what the actual facts are or might be. Similarly,
this need to follow executive positions in the historic bay area is
based on a need to allow the Executive to alter the United States
position as necessary. Because of the unique position of the Executive in the submerged lands cases, its prerogatives have been lim180.

352 F. Supp. at 821.
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ited to the extent that no radical change in position and history
can be effected for the purpose of the litigation. This unique position results from the fact that the United States appears to protect
not only the foreign relations role in which it represents the entire
United States but also a material interest in the property in dispute. Nevertheless, when there is the possibility of some dispute
over the historic bay status of an area the court has given the
Executive the power to tip the balance in deference to the foreign
relations power. Accordingly, the court may not sit as a neutral
arbiter of the legal conclusions to be reached from the historic
facts.
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the clear beyond
doubt test to mean that a court may find against the United States
on a historic bay question only if the United States dislaimer is
baseless,""1 the district court did not apply the test in that way.
Rather the district court appeared to apply the test to the facts in
dispute and not to the ultimate legal conclusions on the status of
the Inlet. The trial court's handling of the facts in this case demonstrates that this view is the proper one. The court began the discussion of the facts by discounting the United States disclaimers:
Considering the circumstances under which they were prepared, the
Court assigns a low reliability factor to the disclaimers. The first
disclaimer was a letter from the Legal Advisor to the Secretary of
State.['82 ] The Court finds the evidence to show the disclaimer
to have been hastily prepared and based on questionable research.
The second disclaimer was prepared two years after the commencement of this action, and was vulnerable to self-serving interests."3
This discussion indicates that the court did not view the disclaimers as an exercise of the independent power of the Executive
over foreign relations. The court's error is especially glaring if one
compares the disclaimers in the Cook Inlet case with those in the
second Californiacase. In the Californiacase, there were no letters
from the State Department; the so-called disclaimers were the
181. See Note 142 supra and accompanying text.
182. Since there was no such letter in evidence the Court probably intended
to refer to a letter to the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior dated May 3,
1962, from the Legal Adviser, "for the Acting Secretary of State." Letter from
Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State to Frank J. Barry, Solicitor of the
Dep't of the Interior, May 3, 1962 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 58).
183. 352 F. Supp. at 819.
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briefs of the United States Department of Justice advocating the
federal government's position that the bays in question were not
historic. In the Cook Inlet case, on the other hand, there was one
letter, which preceded the filing of the lawsuit,' 4 from the Acting
Legal Adviser to the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior,
another from the Legal Adviser to the Department of Justice'85 and
a third from the Secretary of State to the Attorney General. 8 It
was noted that in the handling of the Commandant's line in the
third Louisiana case the Court found extrajudicial disclaimers in
the form of statements of Coast Guard personnel.'87 Similar statements were even present in the case of Cook Inlet, for in 1952 the
question arose of United States jurisdiction over Canadian vessels
fishing in lower Cook Inlet more than three miles from shore. The
evidence in the case indicates that the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service decided that the Canadian vessels were fishing in
waters outside of United States jurisdiction and that they were to
be left alone. This decision was followed by a series of letters and
memoranda discussing the question whether Cook Inlet was territory of the United States in which it was concluded that it was
not.'8 8 Accordingly, the court took the narrowest conceivable view
of the role of disclaimers.
In determining what facts are necessary to prove historic inland
waters under international law, the court followed the Supreme
Court's lead and adopted the conclusion made by a United Nations
study.'89 The facts required to be shown according to international
law are:
(1) the exercise of authority over the area by the state claiming the historic right;
184. See note 182 supra.
185. Letter from Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State to Shiro
Kashiwa, Ass't Att'y General, Dep't of Justice, Land and Mineral Resources Div.,
July 3, 1969 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 69).
186. Letter from William P. Rogers, Sec'y of State to John N. Mitchell, Att'y
General, Dep't of Justice, April 14, 1970 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 93).
187. 394 U.S. at 29. See also note 162 supra and accompanying text.
188. Memorandum from Albert M. Day, Director, Fish and Wildlife Service,
to Regional Director, Fish and Wildlife Service, Juneau, Alaska, April 28, 1953,
reprinted in Trial Brief for Plaintiff, Exhibit No. 77.
189. JuridicalRegime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, [1962] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143 (1962) (cited with approval in
United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 23 n.27 (1969)) [hereinafter cited as
JuridicalRegime].
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(2) the continuity of this exercise of authority; and
(3) the attitude of foreign states.
The district court accepted the Supreme Court's clarification of
the last requirement as demanding a showing of foreign acquiescence to the historic title. 9 " Actually, the facts found in this case
do not support a conclusion that it is a historic inland water bay
under international law, much less under the clear beyond doubt
test.
Although there were some minor facts in dispute, the facts found
as indicated by the memorandum opinion and uncontroverted at
trial were the following:
(1) United States authorities had sought to enforce fisheries
regulations against American citizens in lower Cook Inlet
more than three miles from shore and dicta in one 1892 federal
district court opinion, The Kodiac,19 .1 involving one such enforcement action stated that Cook Inlet is Alaskan waters;
(2) the Alien Fishing Act of 1906111 forbad aliens from fishing
in the "waters of Alaska";
(3) United States fishery agents charged with enforcing the
1906 Act did not recall ever seeing a foreign fishing vessel in
Cook Inlet and if they had they would have taken affirmative
action;
(4) the executive order of 1922 establishing the Southwestern
Alaska Fisheries Reservation included all the territorial waters included in Cook Inlet for fishery regulation;
(5) regulations adopted pursuant to the executive order described all the waters of Cook Inlet as part of a fishery regulation district; 9 2 lower Cook Inlet was patrolled pursuant to
those regulations;
(6) the White Act of 1924111 established authority for fishery
regulation of the territorial waters of Alaska;
(7) regulations established under the White Act described all
the waters of lower Cook Inlet as part of a fishery regulation
district;
190. 352 F. Supp. 815, 821 (1972) (citing to United States v. California, 381
U.S. 139, 172 (1965)).
190.1. United States v. The Kodiac, 53 F. 126 (D.C.D. Alas. 1892).
191. Alien Fishing Act, ch. 3299, 34 Stat. 263 (1906).

No. 251, at 8 (9th ed. Jan. 9, 1923).

192.

See

193.

White Act, ch. 272, 43 Stat. 464 (1924).

DEP'T OF COMMERCE CIR.
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(8) lower Cook Inlet was regularly patrolled pursuant to those
regulations;
(9) there were twenty occasions on which Canadian fishing
vessels fished for halibut in lower Cook Inlet during the period
of 1946 to 1972 without interference by United States authorities;
(10) in 1952 one Canadian halibut vessel was found by United
States fishery agents to be fishing in lower Cook Inlet and the
regional officer determined that the vessel was on the high
seas and had a right to continue fishing. No enforcement action was taken against that vessel;
(11) one Japanese vessel, the Banshu Maru, entered Cook
Inlet in 1962 in search of herring. The Banshu Maru was
seized in Shelikof Strait, outside of Cook Inlet, by Alaskan
authorities for violating Alaska's territorial sea in Shelikof
Strait. The captain of the ship signed a statement agreeing
not to fish again in Shelikof Strait or Cook Inlet and was
released. The Japanese Government delivered a diplomatic
protest of the action to the United States claiming a right to
use the high seas in Cook Inlet. Ultimately, the prosecution
was dropped;
(12) subsequent to statehood, Alaska continued to patrol
lower Cook Inlet.
A marshalling of the undisputed facts along the lines of the three
factors necessary to prove a historic bay shows that the court could
not have applied the clear beyond doubt test to the totality of the
facts but rather only to the facts in dispute.
(a) Exercise of Authority over the Area by the State Claiming
the Historic Right.-The court found the claims of the exercise of
authority in the language of the laws, regulations and orders listed
above. Neither those laws nor the orders specifically refer to Cook
Inlet but rather to "the waters of Alaska." The regulations do
include the area in fishery zones and might arguably be used to
support a claim of jurisdiction. They fail, however, to support any
claim to inland water jurisdiction as is required. As the Supreme
Court pointed out when discussing the Commandant's line
claimed by Louisiana, the authority claimed must be of inland
water status.' Since fishery regulation is permitted both in the
194.

United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 23-26 (1969).
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inland waters and the territorial sea the claim of fishery jurisdiction could at most support a territorial water claim.' Furthermore, if the court sought to use fishery patrols to support a historic
inland water claim and exercise of jurisdiction, it would fail for the
same reasons. Similarly, fishery enforcement activities against
United States subjects would not establish territorial rights
against foreign nations since both domestic and international law
recognize the power of the sovereign to subject its citizens to its
laws even in areas outside the nation's territorial jurisdiction."",'
Furthermore, court dicta, as in The Kodiac, is not an exercise of
authority.
(b) Continuity of This Exercise of Authority.-As the court indicated, there is no doubt that from 1906 to the present the United
States and its successor, the State of Alaska, have claimed the
right to exclude aliens from fishing in the territorial waters of
Alaska pursuant to a series of statutes and one proclamation. The
court also found that from 1906 fishery agents intended to seize
foreign vessels found fishing anywhere in Cook Inlet. Furthermore,
fishery regulations from 1923 to the present purported to include
all of Cook Inlet in domestic fishery regulations.
Even if it is assumed that this evidence standing alone would
support a proof of continuity of authority, the fact is that the
continuity was broken a number of times. Each time one of the
twenty Canadian fishing vessels fished in lower Cook Inlet this
continuity was broken. The entry of the Banshu Maru would also
serve this purpose. The United Nations study addresses the question concerning how many unprosecuted incursions would destroy
the continuity. It indicates that the answer is unclear but that one
minor incident would not.'9 6 Twenty such incidents, however,
should be enough, and if it is not clearly so, the question would
surely be at least arguable. If it is arguable, the proof of historic
inland water bay status that is clear beyond doubt is absent.
Furthermore, the United Nations study indicates that the continuity requires a period of time.'97 The court never addressed this
question to determine whether the duration of the exercise of authority was sufficient. Some authorities indicate that the time
195. 2 A. SHALowrrz, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIEs 378 (1964).
195.1. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
196. JuridicalRegime, supra note 189, at 17-18.
197. Id. at 15; see Post-Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 46-47.
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must be through time immemorial; thus, the claim and exercise
9
must have existed as long as there have been records of the area. "
Surely this was not found.
(c) The Attitude of Foreign States.-As indicated above, the
court used the requirement that there be a showing of acquiescence
by foreign nations. Its conclusion was that the evidence of only
twenty Canadian ships and one Japanese ship conducting fishing
activities in Cook Inlet was not sufficient to offset its conclusion
that foreign nations acquiesed in the claim. This reasoning apparently placed the burden of proof on the United States to show
objections of nations rather than on the State of Alaska to prove
actual acquiescence by other nations. Even this burden was sustained by the United States through proof that the Government of
Japan had claimed a right to use the high seas in Cook Inlet for
fishery purposes through its delivery of a diplomatic protest to the
United States in spite of Alaskan actions against the Banshu
9 9 It is almost as difficult to find Canadian acquiescence.
Maru.1
Twenty of its ships fished in Cook Inlet over a 30-year period. It
must be found that the Canadian Government knew of these activities since the proof of them came from a joint Canadian-United
States Government Commission established to oversee halibut
fishing of both countries. 20 Furthermore, the word acquiescence
would appear to require that foreign nations were put on notice of
the claim so that they had an opportunity to react to the claim.
No finding of such notice was indicated, much less a reaction.
In light of these conclusions it appears that Cook Inlet is not a
historic inland water bay either under the standard of proof required by general international law or under the requirement of
proof clear beyond doubt as set out by the Supreme Court in the
submerged lands cases. Accordingly, little reliance should be
placed on this case in developing the law for the submerged lands
cases and it can be expected that the United States will ultimately
prevail in this Cook Inlet case. The case does stand, however, to
198. See Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 27 BRrT.
Y.B. Irr'LL. 332, 339 (1950).
199. The text of the protest, which was dated May 3, 1962, was in evidence
as United States Exhibit No. 57.
200. This was proved through the deposition of an official of the Pacific Halibut Commission and the introduction of records of the Canadian Halibut vessels
in question. Appellate Brief for the United States at 34-37.
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emphasize the conclusion reached in the discussion of the third
Louisiana case that the influence of the Executive over decisions
in these submerged lands cases has significantly diminished since
the first and second Californiacases."0 '
B. An Evaluation of the Deference Doctrine
in the Submerged Lands Cases
As the previous section demonstrated, the deference doctrine is
used in varying degrees in the submerged lands cases. There was
little discussion in those cases of the reasons for its use at all. Aside
from citations to the Jones and Coopercases,2 2 reliance was placed

primarily on an overzealous listing of the impact of changes in the
control over the territorial sea vis-A-vis other countries. 213 Since the
Submerged Lands Act, in essence, determined that these factors
were not as significant as indicated in the first Californiaopinion
even Justice Black abandoned the position he advocated in that
decision and indicated in a dissent to the third Louisiana decision
that the dispute involves "no part of international affairs subject
to international law, but is exclusively a domestic controversy between the State and [the Union] ."204

Although the deference cases in other fields each have their indi201. The Special Master's report in the Florida case is more consistent with
the view urged in this article. Report of the Special Master, United States v.
Florida, No. 52 Original, at 36-47; see note 145 supra. His statement of the
international law requirements for an historic bay was: "From these opinions of
the Court and the authorities upon which they rely, I conclude that the criteria
for establishing the existence of an historic bay or historic inland waters are three.
First, there must be an open, notorious and effective exercise of sovereign authority over the area not merely with respect to local citizens but as against foreign
nationals as well; second,'this authority must have been exercised for a considerable period of time; and, third, foreign states must have acquiesced in the exercise
of this authority as against their nationals." Id. at 41. In contrast to the court in
the Alaska case, the Special Master felt free to rely on disclaimers of the United
States made in the course of the litigation and on a set of maps depicting the
United States territorial sea that were recently prepared by the United States.
Id. at 42. The portions of the set of maps applicable to Cook Inlet also were offered
as disclaimers in the A laska case, Post-Trial Brief for Appellant at 31 (United
States Exhibit No. 119).
202. E.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 34 (1947).
203. E.g., 332 U.S. at 34-37.
204. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 81 (1969).
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vidual characteristics, there are certain common factors to be con15

sidered.
1. Strong Indicators. (a) The Constitution.-It is clear that
there is no constitutional allocation to the Executive to decide
issues relating to the extent of the submerged lands held by the
states. Nor is there a constitutional allocation of authority to the
Executive to determine the extent of the territory of the United
States. If any allocation exists, it is to the Congress through its
law-making power or the states pursuant to article IV, section 3:
"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution
shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United
States, or of any particular state." '
(b) Property or TerritorialRights of ForeignNations.-Since the
property or territory of no individual nation is the subject of the
litigation, it is difficult to conceive of a judgment that would affect
such rights. The community of nations, however, and thus each
nation, claims rights in the high seas. To the extent that an order
in the submerged lands cases would diminish or expand United
States claims in the oceans, other nations' rights would be conversely diminished. It is not necessary for any particular nation to
claim high seas rights to any particular area in dispute to support
an argument for deference; the existence of such a claim, however,
would make the argument stronger.
Nevertheless, the question whether the submerged lands decisions actually determine the extent of United States claims in the
oceans is an open question. This matter must be addressed in order
to dispose of this factor as well as a number of others. The argument that these cases determine the extent of United States claims
in the ocean proceeds from the Court's delimitation of the "coast
line" for the purposes of the Submerged Lands Act since that line
also determines the "baseline" as defined in the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. By defining this line the
Court consequently determines the location of the United States
205. See Pt. I (C) supra.
206. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. The sentence preceding this quotation, which
forbids the Congress from creating a new state out of the territory of an existing
state without the consent of the legislature of the affected state, indicates that
the power may not even lie in the Congress.
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territorial sea since the United States uses the Convention's baseline.
The specific orders of the Court in these cases, however, are
limited to defining the rights granted by the Congress to the
states."" A reading of the Submerged Lands Act demonstrates that
it is a quitclaim of any rights the United States has in the resources
of the seabed and waters of the area in question. All questions of
international relations that do not involve resource-related rights
are specifically reserved to the federal government. Furthermore,
most of the resources in question are clearly within United States
jurisdiction since the United States as a nation has the exclusive
right to the resources of the continental shelf. Even using the narrowest limit of the continental shelf, the 200-meter depth criterion,
the limit averages 50 miles from shore. '" The resources of the waters within twelve miles of shore are also largely held by the United
States pursuant to its exclusive fishery zone and claim to territorial sea.2 "" Except in the case of extravagant claims of long
straight baselines and large historic bays, it is inconceivable that
the normal three-and nine-mile grants of the Submerged Lands
Act would affect areas seaward of the continental shelf that could
be the subject of international interests. An additional fact assures
that the Court orders will not prejudice international rights; all the
Court decisions are phrased strictly in terms of a quitclaim of
rights rather than absolute rights of the state vis-A-vis the rest of
the world. Accordingly, these judgments do not explicitly determine the rights of the community of nations.
Although it is clear that the location of the territorial sea of the
United States is not determined in the submerged lands litigation,
it is another question whether that determination is binding on the
United States either in other litigation related directly to the loca207. The most recent decree is a partial decree in United States v. Louisiana
(Louisiana Boundary Case), 404 U.S. 388 (1971). Others are United States v.
Louisiana (Texas Boundary Case), 394 U.S. 836 (1969), United States v. California, 382 U.S. 448 (1966), United States v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 288 (1965), United
States v. Louisiana, 364 U.S. 502 (1960), United States v. Texas, 340 U.S. 900
(1950), United States v. Louisiana, 340 U.S. 899 (1950) and United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 804 (1947). See note 113 supra.
208. SPECIAL SEN. SUBCOMM. ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, 91ST CONG. 2D
SESS., REPORT ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF TO THE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND

INSULAR AFFAIRS 13 (Comm. Print 1970).
209. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-94 (1970).
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tion of the territorial sea or in the foreign relations activities of the
United States. The first question obviously involves the affirmative use of collateral estoppel. In light of the demise of mutuality
of estoppel through Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust
& Savings Association2 1 and its progenitors 21 I a serious argument
can be made that, since the location of the baseline was fully
litigated in a series of the most important cases, the decisions
would be found to be collateral estoppel against the United States
in any subsequent litigation.
As to the second question whether the submerged lands decisions would bind the United States in its international affairs, the
question is moie practical than legal. First, it would be extremely
difficult for the United States to take a position that is contrary
to a Supreme Court decision when negotiating with a foreign country. To say the least, a contrary position taken by the United
States in such negotiations would be weakened by the Supreme
Court opinion. There is no doubt that foreign countries do monitor
the cases that relate to foreign relations.21 2 Secondly, the executive
departments have an obligation to follow the law. Thus, an interpretation of a treaty made by the courts would appear to be strong
evidence of what the law is, at least domestically. If so, it would
be difficult to justify a different interpretation by the State Department in its conduct of foreign relations.
Accordingly, a moderately strong argument can be made that
the submerged lands decisions ultimately do affect the property
and territorial rights claimed by foreign nations in the high seas.
(c) The Judgment Will Run to a Foreign Country.-Since no
foreign country is a party to this litigation there is no possibility
of a judgment ordering a foreign nation to do or not do something.
As a matter of precedent, however, the submerged lands decisions
could determine the propriety of United States prosecutions of
2 13
aliens for violation of United States territorial jurisdiction.
210. 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
211. E.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313 (1971); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
212. See Minquiers & Erehos Case, [1953] I.C.J. 47. In that case Great Brit-

ain's legal position was put in question by the submission of a British Court
opinion in opposition to the British position in that case.
213. This would include: (1) the prohibition against alien fishing in the United
States territorial sea (16 U.S.C. §§ 1081-86 (1970)), (2) the same prohibition
applying to the exclusive fishery zone (16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-94 (1970)), (3) oil pollu-
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(d) Judgment Will Require the United States to Act Vis-&-vis
Foreign Nations.-No order in these cases will actually order the
United States to act vis-A-vis another nation or the community of
nations.2 1 1 The same indirect effects which relate to rights of foreign nations and which are described above are present here. The
United States territorial claims may be determined in fact if not
in law. In addition, the effect of United States protests relating to
territorial claims of foreign nations will be similarly affected, especially in light of United States protests relating to foreign claims
of historic bays and straight baselines. 211 A domestic court decision
stating the law to be contrary to the United States position internationally would diminish the strength of these protests.
(e) Statutory Authorization for the Executive's Position.-No
congressional authorization for executive determinations of the
United States territorial extent or the states' rights under the Submerged Lands Act is present, even in the case of straight baselines.
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
makes the establishment of a system of straight baselines optional
tion (33 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970)) and (4) customs (19 U.S.C. § 1701 (1970)), among
others.
214. See note 207 supra.
215. For the United States protest concerning the Soviet Union's claim to
Peter the Great Bay as a historic bay see 37 DEP'T STATE BULL. 588 (1957); 38
DEP'T STATE BULL. 461 (1958). The United States has also disputed Canada's

historic bay claim to Hudson Bay. 4 M.

WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL

LAw

236-37 (1965). The majority of United States protests concern the breadth of the
territorial sea and fisheries zones. Indicative of the United States protests are the
following: Brazil (200-mile territorial sea); Canada (12-mile territorial sea and
100-mile pollution control zone); Ghana (30-mile territorial sea); Haiti (12-mile
territorial sea, 15-mile fisheries zone, and straight baselines); Mauritania (30mile territorial sea); Nigeria (30-mile territorial sea); Senegal (12-mile territorial
sea and 110-mile fisheries zone); and Sierra Leone (200-mile territorial sea). The
United States has also filed protests with Indonesia and the Philippines contesting the drawing of baselines around archipelagos. Letter from the Office of the
Assistant Legal Adviser for Ocean Affairs to the author, Dec. 6, 1973. The United
States contends that under article 4 of the Territorial Sea Convention straight
baselines may be drawn only to join islands in a coastline archipelago, not those
in a mid-ocean archipelago. Additional protests include: Mexico (12-mile territorial sea and straight baselines in Gulf of Mexico); Morocco (12-mile territorial
sea and 70-mile fisheries zone); Argentina (200-mile territorial sea); Uruguay
(200-mile territorial sea); and Ecuador (200-mile territorial sea). Letter from
Director, Office of the Geographer, Dep't of State to the author, Jan. 9, 1974.
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with the coastal state. 216 The Supreme Court has held it would
defer to an executive denial in that situation but did not decide
that it is the Executive that has the power to establish a system
of straight baselines. Rather, it stated that the decision is left to
the "federal government." This appears to be a reference to the
Congress as well as the Executive for the Court usually used the
term "United States" when generally referring to the positions of
the Executive put forward in the litigation:
In United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 168 we held that "the
choice under the Convention to use the straight baseline method for
determining inland waters claimed against other nations is one that
rests with the Federal Government, and not with the individual
States." Since the United States asserts that it has not drawn and
does not want to draw straight baselines along the Louisiana coast,
that disclaimer1 7 would, under the California decision, be conclusive
of the matter.
Although this language is not completely clear, it is implied that
the power to implement a system of straight baselines does not rest
with the Executive alone.
In conclusion, it is apparent that arguments can be made that
these indicators favor deference. These arguments, however, require expansive inferences, and are not as clear as in other areas
in which the deference doctrine has been applied. The more reasonable view would hold that the strong indicators support the
conclusion that deference is not appropriate.
2. Other Indicators. (a) Availability of Legal Standards.Submerged lands questions that hinge on an interpretation or
implementation of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone present sources for legal analysis that are as good
as or better than those found for domestic statutes. In addition to
the text of the Convention, there are extensive preparatory materials and legal opinions.1 8 Since the Convention covers every question but historic bays, a discussion of historic bays is required.
216. "In localities where the coast line is deeply indented and cut into, or if
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method
of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." Convention,
art. 4, 1 (emphasis added).
217. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 72 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
218. See note 165 supra.
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Unlike most areas of international law, the historic bay question
has been the subject of two extensive United Nations studies." '
These studies have included summaries of the facts of many historic bay situations as well as collections of legal opinions on the
matter and discussions of the law. Furthermore, many writers have
made their own contribution to the subject. "" Accordingly, materials are readily available for a court to reach its own conclusion on
the law governing historic bays. On the other hand, there are significant differences among the writers and nations that have expressed their opinion on the elements required to establish a historic inland water bay. The United States Supreme Court has
determined that three elements must be proved: (1) exercise of
authority over the area claimed by the state claiming the historic
right; (2) continuity of the exercise of authority; and (3) the acquiescence of foreign states.22 ' These elements, however, leave
many questions unresolved, as seen above in the discussion of the
222
Cook Inlet case.
Although the dispute relating to the law of historic bays has not
reached the crisis stage of the expropriation question discussed in
219. JuridicalRegime, supra note 189; Memorandum by the Secretariat of the
United Nations, Historic Bays, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 13.1 (1964).
220.

E.g., L. BOUCHEZ, THE REGIME OF BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (1964);
THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION (1927);
M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962); I A.
SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 22-24 (1962); M. STROHL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BAYS 3-4 (1963).

P. JESSUP,

221. See note 190 supra and accompanying text.
222. Some open questions are: (1) exercise: (a) Does this require more than
legislation or rule making?; (b) What authority must be claimed?; (c) How does
a nation exercise authority if no nation tests its authority?; (d) What must be
done if a nation's claim is violated?; and (e) Is exercise of jurisdiction over nationals sufficient?; (2) continuity: (a) How many failures to exercise authority and
with what frequency destroy the continuity?; (b) How long must the claim be in
effect before it has ripened?; (c) What must be done to maintain the continuity
if the claim is never tested?; (d) Do diplomatic protests break the continuity?;
and if so is there a minimum number?; and (e) Is the continuity broken if an alien
is subjected to authority without the consent of his government?; (3) foreign
states: (a) Do they have to affirmatively consent?; (b) Do they have to have notice
and not complain?; (c) Do they have to have constructive notice and not complain?; (d) Is lack of knowledge or constructive notice combined with no foreign
reaction sufficient?; (e) Does the action of an alien vessel represent the position
of the alien government? Most of these problems are pointed out in the two
United Nations studies, supra note 219.
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the context of the act of state doctrine,2 3 there are some extremely
diverse positions found in the community of nations. As a result,
a court would be justified in finding that the law of historic bays
is sufficiently unclear to require deference, but the court would not
be required by necessity to do so. On the other hand, the absence
of the option for the court to refuse to decide the substantive questions, an option it has in the act of state and sovereign immunity
cases, might support the conclusion that deference is the least
offensive alternative.
(b) United States a Party.-Not only is the United States a
party but it is a very interested party. The extent of the territory
involved, the value of the resources in the area and the critical
need for these resources especially as sources of energy indicate the
24
extent of the United States interest in these cases.
(c) Source of the Executive's Position.-This question has to
be answered on a case-by-case basis. Some of the positions relied
on by the courts in these cases have been extrajudicial statements
of the executive departments and have preceded the litigation. At
this stage, however, the likelihood of the existence of extrajudicial
statements has greatly decreased. Since these cases began in the
late 1940's the federal government has been aware that all related
positions concerning any state's coasts may eventually be the subject of litigation. Thus, all positions subsequent to the filing of the
California case cannot be viewed as wholly extrajudicial. Many of
the positions relied on as disclaimers of historic bays and straight
baselines have been prepared in response to specific requests for
opinions on specific matters in litigation. On the other hand, there
have been a large number of diplomatic contacts on law of the sea
matters and the United States position in those matters has been
dominated by interests other than the submerged lands litigation.
Nevertheless, these positions cannot be viewed as untainted by the
2
litigation. 1
(d) Rights Involved.-Since the dispute is between the states
223. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
224. The impounded funds released to the United States as a result of the
most recent partial decree in the Louisiana submerged lands controversy, 404
U.S. 388 (1971), was over one billion dollars.
225. The Supreme Court has even allowed for the litigation interest to affect
the foreign relations positions. In refusing to discount disclaimers of systems of
straight baselines based on their self serving nature, the Court said: "It would be
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and the federal government, the interests are public, and no question of individual liberties or individual rights is involved.
III.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent from a review of the submerged lands issues in
light of the identified factors that deference should play no role in
these cases. The argument for deference, however, is strongest in
the case of historic bays. Since the factors were theoretically derived from Supreme Court case law, it would appear that either the
factors do not represent the Court's thinking or that the Court has
failed to apply them in the submerged lands cases.
Assuming that the factors are the proper ones to consider, it
would appear that the Court should review its position on the
submerged lands litigation and bring it into conformity with them.
It may be that the trend away from deference which was noted
above is part of that reconsideration. In addition, it would be appropriate for all future deference cases to be considered in light of
articulated factors such as those isolated in this article.
In future considerations of the submerged lands issues, it is important that a strong case for deference be shown before the doctrine is invoked. Any aspect of deference, from the absolute
unquestioning adherence to an executive position to consideration
of it as having great weight, is in derogation of the courts' responsibility to decide cases according to the law. Of course, if the separation of powers allocates the decision to another branch, failure of
the courts to decide the issue is theoretically not an abrogation of
responsibility. Any case or controversy before a United States
court, however, is presumptively subject to the court's adjudicatory power and responsibility to decide judicially. It is preferable
in general that controversies be resolved according to the law. In
contrast, deference can be viewed as allowing a decision to be
judicially made regardless of the substantive law. This view is
inappropriate for this Court to review or overturn the considered decision of the
United States, albeit partially motivated by a domestic concern, not to extend
its borders to the furthest extent consonant with international law." United
States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 73 (1969).

In fact it is difficult to make the distinction between domestic and international
interests the Court purports to make. Despite all the high motives, the foreign
relations of any country is merely a tool for satisfying domestic interests. That
would include anything from war and peace to the oil trade.
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neither novel nor unrecognized in the deference field. Perhaps the
most authoritative statement on the matter was made by Justice
Powell in his concurrance in First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba.22 In arguing for a review of the legality of the
Cuban expropriation, he discounted the argument that the international law was unclear:
I do not agree, however, that balancing the functions of the judiciary
and those of the political branches compels the judiciary to eschew
acting in all cases in which the underlying issue is the validity of
expropriation under customary international law. Such a result
would be an abdication of the judiciary's responsibility to persons
who seek to resolve their grievances by the judicial process.
Nor do I think the doctrine of separation of powers dictates such
an abdication. To so argue is to assume that there is no such thing
as international law but only international political disputes that
can be resolved only by an exercise of power. Admittedly, international legal disputes are not as separable from politics as are domestic legal disputes, but I am not prepared to say that international
law may never be determined and applied by the judiciaiy where
there has been an "act of state." Until international tribunals command a wider constituency, the courts of various countries afford
the best means for development of a respected body of international
law. There is less hope for progress in this long-neglected area if the
resolution of all disputes involving "an act of state" is relegated to
political rather than judicial process.
Unless it appears that an exercise of jurisdiction would interfere
with delicate foreign relations conducted by the political branches,
I conclude that federal courts have an obligation to hear cases such
27

as this.1

406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
406 U.S. at 774-76 (footnote omitted); see P. JESSUP, THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 63-101 (1959); Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International
Legal Order, 39 IND. L. REV. 429, 441 (1964).
226.
227.
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